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Article

No Longer a Neutral Magistrate: The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in
the Wake of the War on Terror
†

††

Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein &
†††
Caitlinrose Fisher
Secrecy, even what would be agreed by reasonable men to be
necessary secrecy, has, by a subtle and barely perceptible accretive process, placed constraints upon the liberties of the Ameri1
can people.—Church Committee, 1976
† Walter F. Mondale is a 1956 graduate of the University of Minnesota
Law School, which now holds his name—Mondale Hall. He served on the Minnesota Law Review and as a law clerk for the Minnesota Supreme Court. Just
four years out of law school, Mondale became the youngest Attorney General
of Minnesota. Later, as a United States Senator, Mondale was an instrumental member of the Church Committee. He chaired the Domestic Task Force
and investigated intelligence abuses against Americans by its own agencies.
The Domestic Task Force uncovered numerous violations of constitutional
rights, and the proposals of the Church Committee called for permanent Senate and House committees on intelligence that would have authority over the
entire intelligence community. In 1976, Mondale was elected Vice President of
the United States. In the White House, Mondale continued to shape intelligence policy. In particular, in 1978, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) was passed and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was
created to oversee requests for surveillance warrants against suspected foreign intelligence agents inside the United States. Mondale has a recurrent
long-term interest in the operation of FISA and remains a strong advocate for
the privacy rights of Americans.
†† Professor Robert A. Stein rejoined the faculty of the University of
Minnesota Law School as Everett Fraser Professor of Law in the fall of 2006.
Previously, from 1994 to 2006, Stein was the Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of the American Bar Association (ABA), the world’s largest voluntary professional membership association, with more than 400,000 members. Prior to that, Stein was Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School
from 1979 to 1994 and was the first William S. Pattee Professor of Law from
1990 until 1994.
††† Caitlinrose Fisher received her J.D. summa cum laude from the University of Minnesota Law School in 2015. She is currently a law clerk on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The authors wish to thank Frederick A.O. (Fritz) Schwarz, Jr., Elizabeth
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INTRODUCTION
Our nation’s founders put in place constitutional checks,
such as the Fourth Amendment and three co-equal branches of
government, to ensure that the very constitutional liberties we
fight for abroad are not undermined domestically in the name
of “foreign intelligence” and “national security.” Since the
founding of our republic, however, the government has struggled with maintaining an appropriate balance between gathering intelligence for national security purposes and protecting
the privacy of United States citizens throughout the course of
that intelligence gathering. Often in times of “crisis,” executive
and intelligence officials act with impunity under the guise of
national security, eroding the very values that are the bedrock
of our constitutional republic.
In response to executive overreach in the mid-twentieth
century, the United States Senate formed the United States Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Re2
spect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) —a committee charged with investigating overreach and illegal
3
activities by the executive branch. The revelations of that
committee led to significant reform, including: (1) the permanent establishment of congressional intelligence committees to
oversee intelligence agencies, and (2) the enactment of the For4
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The lessons learned
by the Church Committee and enshrined in FISA, however,
5
were quickly forgotten in the wake of 9/11.
Goitein, Faiza Patel, and Laura Donohue for their thoughtful comments on
this Article. We are also grateful to Andrew Lugar, United States Attorney for
the District of Minnesota, for providing us with a practical perspective of law
enforcement challenges on the ground. Any errors are, of course, our own.
Copyright © 2016 by Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein & Caitlinrose Fisher.
1. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 9 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMM. REPORT,
BOOK I].
2. The Church Committee is so named for its chairman, Senator Frank
Church.
3. That committee engaged in the most “thorough investigation ever
made of United States intelligence” and consisted of a staff of 100, which conducted over 800 interviews, 250 executive hearings, and compiled over 110,000
pages of documentation. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 7.
4. An Act to Authorize Electronic Surveillance to Obtain Foreign Intelligence Information (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978), Pub. L. No.
95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (1978)).
5. See Margo Schlanger, Infiltrate the NSA, ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/civil-libertarians-need-to
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Two of the authors previously wrote an essay on the
“strange and challenging subject” of national security and indi6
vidual justice. That essay, as does this Article, drew upon the
unique perspective of Vice President Mondale to inform the authors’ analysis of the appropriate balance between national security and personal liberties. As a senator, Vice President
Mondale served on the Church Committee. In particular, Vice
President Mondale served as chairman of the subcommittee
that drafted the Church Committee’s final report on domestic
intelligence activities. Later, when in the White House, Vice
President Mondale was not only instrumental to the passage of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act but also served on the
National Security Council, observing and working with executive intelligence agencies from a distinct perspective. The Vice
President is described as someone who recognizes that “[c]ivil
liberties and protecting homeland security are bound together,
not inevitable foes,” and “[o]pen government and loyalty are al7
lies rather than tools of subversion.” Vice President Mondale
thus offers a unique, pragmatic, and particularly informed perspective on maintaining an appropriate balance between security and liberty.
The parallels between the intelligence community’s overreach that catalyzed the formation of the Church Committee
and the current actions of the intelligence community are trou8
bling. We may lack a comprehensive report detailing the extent of modern government surveillance. But, there is evidence
of misuse of surveillance technology by the government, and,
because of a lack of meaningful congressional and judicial oversight, we can fairly infer that the government’s use of surveil-infiltrate-the-nsa/383932 (“The intelligence scandals of the 1970s arose out of
programs remarkably similar to post-9/11 mass surveillance.”).
6. Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein & Monica C. Fahnhorst, National
Security and the Constitution: A Conversation Between Walter F. Mondale and
Robert A. Stein, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2011 (2014).
7. Lawrence R. Jacobs, Walter F. Mondale: In the Tradition of James
Madison (Apr. 2008) (unpublished essay), http://mondale.law.umn.edu/pdf/
JacobsEssay.pdf.
8. Intelligence overreach is neither a partisan nor temporal issue. The
Committee investigated six administrations from Franklin Roosevelt’s
through Richard Nixon’s and concluded that all had abused their secret powers: “intelligence excesses, at home and abroad, have been found in every administration. They are not the product of any single party, administration, or
man.” SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at viii (1976) [hereinafter
CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II].
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lance technology has the potential to infringe on citizens’ constitutional liberties. This Article addresses the myriad ways
that FISA and today’s Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISA Court or FISC)—established in response to the Church
Committee’s revelations—have veered off course from their
original design, tipping the balance once again toward “national security” at the cost of fundamental constitutional liberties.
Part I begins by providing a historical overview of the intersection between national security and personal liberties—from the
original intent of the framers, to revelations of the Church
Committee, to post-9/11 practices exposed by Edward Snowden
and subsequent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.
Part II explores the intelligence community’s difficulty balancing intelligence operations with individual liberties, focusing on
the ways in which post-9/11 amendments to FISA decrease the
FISA Court’s ability to serve its intended role as an impartial
arbiter and check on intelligence agencies. Part III proposes a
series of reforms that would realign intelligence activities and
the FISA Court with the findings and recommendations of the
Church Committee. Finally, Part IV concludes by considering
broader systemic changes that should be made to ensure the intelligence community does not revert back to unconstitutional
practices in the name of “security” when the next crisis arises.
Before diving into the delicate topic of the nexus between
national security and individual liberty, we want to make a few
points clear. We strongly support two goals: first, a vigorous
and effective national security program; second, effective constraints on that program, to ensure national security is pursued within the bounds of the Constitution. We recognize and
support the necessity of a strong and effective foreign intelligence program. It is a dangerous world and there are numerous
real threats to the safety of the United States and its citizens.
It is a first priority of government to provide for the safety of its
citizens. An equally important obligation of our government,
however, is to ensure preservation of the constitutional liberties established by our founders and developed through the
decades, for which generations of Americans have given their
lives to defend. We believe—as discussed throughout this Article—that it is necessary and possible to develop a strong and
effective foreign intelligence program within the constitutional
constraints established by our founders. Such a system is not
only constitutionally required but also likely to result in more
effective intelligence operations.
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I. TOEING THE LINE BETWEEN SECURITY AND
LIBERTY—A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
After leaving England’s system of unchecked monarchical
authority, our nation’s founding fathers recognized the importance of enshrining systems of checks and balances and
separation of powers in the Constitution. One notable constitutional provision is the Fourth Amendment, which has evolved
along with technology and notions of privacy. Since the founding of our nation, however, the coordinate branches of government have struggled with the scope of constitutionally protected personal liberties, especially in the wake of national
tragedies such as 9/11. This Part traces the evolution of the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and surveillance in
the name of “national security,” beginning in Section A with
seminal cases. Section B then turns to the intelligence community’s invasion of personal liberties in the mid-twentieth century, which catalyzed the Church Committee and, eventually,
FISA. Section C discusses fundamental changes Congress made
to FISA in the wake of 9/11. Those changes eroded the structural and procedural protections recommended by the Church
Committee and opened the door to intelligence overreach similar to what existed before the formation of the Church Committee. Section D concludes by discussing society’s—and Congress’s—response to that overreach, concluding with an
overview of the recently enacted FREEDOM Act. This Part sets
forth the push and pull historically inherent in the government’s prioritization of intelligence and individual liberties.
A. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
Central to the constitutional democracy envisioned by the
founding fathers were personal liberties and privacy interests.
The framers sought to create a system in which no single individual or entity would “be blindly trusted to wield power wise9
ly.” This was not only a concern of the framers but also of the
colonists in general—a core issue throughout ratification was
whether the Constitution would establish sufficient checks on
government so that the rights of the individual would not fall
10
victim to the powers of the government. The Fourth Amend9. FREDERICK
BALANCED 2 (2007).

A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UN-

10. See, e.g., Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
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ment itself was a response to British kings’ revenue officers’
use of “general warrants” to conduct “unrestricted, indiscrimi11
nate searches of persons and homes.” Thus, the framers recognized the importance of individual liberties to the democratic
society they envisioned and put specific provisions into the
Constitution to ensure the protection of those liberties, regardless of the status of national and foreign policy.
The Fourth Amendment quickly operated as a check on executive authority, serving the role envisioned by the framers.
The Fourth Amendment required following certain “judicial
12
processes” to curb executive overreach. For example, an impartial magistrate had to rule on the validity of a search before
13
it was conducted. These procedural requirements not only
served to protect individual liberties but also sent a message to
the executive branch that no person or entity, including those
14
wielding the most power in society, was “above the law.”
As technology evolved (permitting intelligence agencies to
collect significantly more information without ever entering a
home) and intelligence agencies continued to push constitutional boundaries, the Supreme Court stepped in to limit domestic surveillance activities and redefine the scope of the
15
Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States, the Court over16
ruled a prior decision and held that the Fourth Amendment
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at
44, 58, 445, 588, 663 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., rev. vol. 1891).
11. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 27–28. These “general warrants”
raise similar concerns to the wiretaps used by the intelligence community today.
12. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); see also Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1926) (rejecting the argument that an unlawful search
can be remedied by any evidence of wrongdoing it uncovers).
13. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32–33 (1925). Therefore,
even if probable cause may have existed, without that determination prior to
execution of the search, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. See Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963) (noting that the warrant
requirement insures a “deliberate, impartial judgment” is “interposed between
the citizen and the police”).
14. Rule of law principles, drawn from the Magna Carta, greatly influenced the constitutional framers. One of the key tenants of the rule of law is
“government by laws and not by men”—a concept attributable to Aristotle.
See, e.g., Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L.
293, 297 (2009).
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment only applied to tangible things, not the
search and seizure of intangible things, such as conversations. In dissent, Justice Brandeis criticized the majority’s narrow conception of searches, noting
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prohibits warrantless electronic surveillance, recognizing that
electronic surveillance can be just as intrusive as physically en17
tering a private space. However, Katz did not involve “national security,” and the Court declined to consider the scope of the
Fourth Amendment in the national security context. Injecting
ambiguity into the opinion, the majority included a footnote
stating that there may be an exception to the warrant require18
ment in cases involving “national security.” Concurring, Justice Douglas challenged the footnote, arguing that the President (or his agent) could “not [be] detached, disinterested, and
19
neutral” in cases involving national security. Justice Douglas
concluded that the Fourth Amendment thus did not permit the
executive branch to fulfill the inherently incompatible positions
of adversary, prosecutor, and neutral/disinterested magis20
trate.
In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to govern
21
wiretapping and electronic surveillance. In doing so, Congress
codified the dicta in Katz and explicitly exempted any surveillance relating to “national security information” from Title III’s

that “[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping” and questioning how it could
be “that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security.” Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“The Government’s activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth . . . . The fact that
the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”). This holding
was subsequently codified in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3711 (1968)).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23 (“Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.”).
19. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas’s concurrence was
a response to Justice White’s, which wholeheartedly supported permitting the
executive alone to determine whether national security permitted deviation
from the traditional warrant requirements. See id. at 364 (White, J., concurring) (“We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate’s
judgment if the President of the United States . . . has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.”). The Church Committee revealed that Presidents and their subordinates abused their power in the very way feared by Justice Douglas—by
invoking the term “national security” to justify excessive surveillance.
20. Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
21. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 §§ 801–804.
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22

procedural requirements. As later exposed by the Church
Committee, in the years following Katz and Title III, enforcement officials utilized Title III’s exception and conducted excessive surveillance in the name of “security,” fulfilling Justice
Douglas’s prophecy. The scope of any national security exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement thus
quickly returned to the Supreme Court.
Within five years of Katz and the enactment of Title III,
the Court was called upon to clarify the scope of Katz’s footnote
twenty-three. In United States v. United States District Court
23
for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith), the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless electronic
surveillance in cases of domestic security. Keith characterized
Katz as recognizing that the “broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into conversational privacy which electronic
surveillance entails necessitate the application of Fourth
24
Amendment safeguards.” Central to the Court’s reasoning was
the risk of executive overreach in the name of national security.
Because executive officers are “charged with . . . investigative
and prosecutorial dut[ies], [they] should not be the sole judges
of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing
25
their tasks.” The Court stressed, however, that its decision
was limited to domestic security and that the Court expressed
no opinion on warrantless surveillance of “foreign powers or
26
their agents.” Despite the Court’s attempts to constrain executive surveillance authority in Katz and Keith, revelations of executive overreach in the name of “security” soon came to light,
catalyzing the formation of the Church Committee and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.
22. In whole, the Act stated that:
Nothing . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to
take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation
against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign
power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to
the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Id. § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1968), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)).
23. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
24. Id. at 313 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 317.
26. Id. at 321–22. Following Keith, the Justice Department limited warrantless wiretapping to cases “involving a ‘significant connection with a foreign power, its agents or agencies,’” but did not apply that limitation to the
NSA’s electronic surveillance programs. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 189.
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B. THE FORMATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHURCH
COMMITTEE
For the majority of the twentieth century, the FBI, CIA,
and NSA escaped meaningful congressional oversight and scrutiny. The Church Committee found that there was a “clear and
sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence
27
community and to ensure its accountability.” Minimal oversight occurred not only so that members of congress could plead
ignorance of intelligence gathering activities but also because
intelligence agencies, and the FBI in particular, “[had a] trove
of embarrassing evidence” they could unleash on any public of28
ficial. In the 1970s, however, after the Watergate scandal and
other revelations of executive overreach, Congress could no
29
longer plead willful blindness. On January 27, 1975, Congress
established the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activity—or “Church
Committee”—to investigate the “allegations of abuse and improper activities by the intelligence agencies” and “take action
to bring the intelligence agencies [within] the constitutional
30
framework.” The Church Committee found that the executive
branch had engaged in decades of warrantless electronic surveillance under the guise of “national security,” predominantly
31
by relying on “vague” and “fuzzy loopholes” in the law.
27. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 15; see also
SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 20 (noting that it was “easier” and “safer” to
give intelligence agencies “a free pass than to do any oversight”). As Senator
Mike Mansfield observed, it was “fashionable . . . for members of Congress to
say that insofar as the intelligence agencies were concerned, the less they
knew about such questions, the better.” Id.
28. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 19–20.
29. Id. at 20.
30. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at III (Letter of
Transmittal by Senator Frank Church, Committee Chairman). The Committee’s charge was two-fold: first, the Committee investigated charges of wrongdoing; second, and more important to our inquiry, the Committee sought “to
learn enough about [the intelligence agencies’] past and present activities to
make the legislative judgments required to assure the American people that
whatever necessary secret intelligence activities were being undertaken were
subject to constitutional processes.” Id. at 5. As an example of the type of illegal government activity to be investigated, the Senate listed “CIA domestic
activities.” CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 1 n.1.
31. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 27–29; see, e.g., CHURCH COMM.
REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 302 (describing the exceedingly broad and
vague “foreign intelligence” standard). For example, the CIA positively engaged in subversion and sabotage under a vague catchall provision of the 1957
National Security Act, which authorized the CIA “to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
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The scope of domestic surveillance was troubling. Often,
groups and individuals were targeted for their political opinion
rather than any risk to national security. Under the guise of
“national security,” intelligence agencies collected information
on: women who attended “Women’s Liberation Movement”
32
meetings; Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
33
(NAACP), and other supporters of the civil rights movement;
34
anti-Vietnam protestors; student groups, including Students
for a Democratic Society and “every Black Student Union and
35
36
similar group”; and even members of congress. The FBI
gathered intelligence about the above-mentioned (and other)
groups allegedly to determine whether communists were infiltrating organizations, although the FBI also documented legit37
imate activities unrelated to communist infiltration.
Intelligence agencies collected intelligence through a variety of means. Agencies “frequently wiretapped and bugged
38
American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant.”
The NSA obtained millions of private telegrams from 1947 to
1975 under a secret arrangement with private telegraph com39
panies. The CIA also instituted a mail-opening program, focusing on mail sent between the Soviet Union and United
40
States. The CIA and NSA would then share the information
collected (which rarely distinguished between foreign and domestic targets) with the FBI, for domestic law enforcement
41
purposes. Despite the clear infringements on individual privaNational Security Council may from time to time direct.” CHURCH COMM. REBOOK I, supra note 1, at 44.
32. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 7.
33. Id. at 7–9, 50, 71–72, 167. The Church Committee collected extensive
information on the surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The FBI
launched a campaign against Dr. King intended to “‘neutralize’ him as an effective civil rights leader.” Id. at 11. Attorney General Robert Kennedy approved the bugging of Dr. King’s home. Id. at 118. For an in-depth discussion
of surveillance of Dr. King, see id. at 219–23.
34. Id. at 49. The CIA collected intelligence on anti-war protestors at the
request of both Presidents Johnson and Nixon. Id. at 98.
35. Id. at 8–9.
36. Id. at 8–10.
37. See id. at 48–49, 81–82, 175, 179–80.
38. Id. at 12. Government officials would often break in and install microphones to capture the conversations of individuals and organizations. See id.
at 13, 60.
39. See id. at 6, 168.
40. See id. at 58–59.
41. See id. at 59.
PORT,
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cy, “question[s] of legality or constitutionality” were either not
42
raised or consciously disregarded.
The Church Committee identified four fundamental institutional flaws that permitted intelligence agencies to subvert
personal liberties in the name of national security. First, national security institutions and laws were organized under
43
“ambiguous laws and fuzzy instructions.” Malleable terms
such as “subversion,” “national security,” and “foreign intelligence” provided intelligence agencies with fodder to collect ex44
cessive information. Second, senior executive officials furthered a culture of impunity by giving implicit orders to violate
45
the law. Third, the intelligence community presumed absolute
46
and permanent secrecy of their operations. Without anticipated testing of actions by Congress and the public, those agencies
acted with greater impunity and less adherence to reasonable
interpretations of the law. Finally, due to a lack of congression47
al oversight, intelligence agencies acted like a “monarchical
48
executive,” unaccountable to any coequal branch of government. Essentially, the Committee reaffirmed a principle recognized by the founding fathers—“unchecked power is prone to
unwise, inefficient application and . . . leads inescapably to
49
abuse.”
Because of the Church Committee’s revelations, Congress
created the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence to provide the requisite “oversight” of intelligence agen42. Id. at 140–46.
43. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 5; see CHURCH COMM. REPORT,
BOOK I, supra note 1, at 4 (“Where statutes do exist, as with the CIA, they are
vague and have failed to provide the necessary guidelines defining missions
and limitations.”); CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 165
(“The absence of precise standards for intelligence investigations of Americans
contributed to overbreadth.”).
44. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 31; see also CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 24–28 (describing the ambiguity of the term
“subversive”).
45. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 11.
46. See id. at 11–12.
47. See id. at 11 (“[I]t is clear that Congress did not carry out effective
oversight.”).
48. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 2–3. The “monarchical executive”
theory is essentially one of “unchecked presidential power.” Id. at 1–2. As noted by Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., this theory has been “deployed to many
ends,” including “to spy on Americans’ telephone calls and e-mails in violation
of federal statutes and, at times, the Fourth Amendment; and to infiltrate and
keep watch on domestic groups protesting government policy.” Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 50.
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50

cies, and enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
51
1978 to provide a more concrete legal framework capable of
limiting and guiding intelligence agencies. These changes were
intended to “strik[e] a fair and just balance between protection
52
of national security and protection of personal liberties.” The
intelligence committees would serve as a permanent check on
executive authority, deterring intelligence agencies from engaging in the overreach that led to the formation of the Church
Committee. And newly enacted legislation, such as FISA, established more concrete statutory guidance and limitations on
the power of those agencies. The Act also created the Foreign
53
Intelligence Surveillance Court. FISC is “a specialized Article
III court established under FISA to review and approve governmental applications” seeking to obtain intelligence through
54
certain methods. FISA also created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), to which the
government may appeal denials of applications to conduct sur55
veillance.
From 1978 to 2001, Congress and the executive branch adhered to the model recommended by the Church Committee,
50. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. Res. 591, 94th Cong. (1976).
51. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (1978)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7 (1977) (stating that Congress
enacted FISA “in large measure [as] a response to the revelations that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security ha[d] been seriously abused”).
52. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 7.
53. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 103(a). FISC is composed of eleven district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States. Additionally, there is a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
of Review, with jurisdiction to hear appeals from the government. That court
is composed of three judges designated by the Chief Justice. For a general
background of the composition of FISC, see generally ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33833, THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND THE U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT OF REVIEW: AN OVERVIEW (2007) (discussing the creation and structure
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence
Court of Review).
54. EDWARD C. LIU ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43459, OVERVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NSA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS 1–2 (2014). Initially, FISA only authorized wiretaps and bugs,
but it was subsequently amended to cover physical searches, pen registers and
trap and trace devices, and business records. See Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601(2), 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–
05 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1843 (1999)); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807(a)(3), 108 Stat. 3423, 3443 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1827 (1994)).
55. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 103(b).
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and three key components of FISA and the FISA Court remained intact. First, the FISA Court only approved applica56
tions for individualized warrants before a search occurred. Second, those warrants only approved gathering of intelligence
information from “foreign power[s]” or “agents of foreign pow57
er[s].” And third, the information requested, if it related to or
concerned a United States person, had to be “necessary” to ob58
taining foreign intelligence information. Those key components changed drastically in the wake of 9/11.
C. ALTERING THE BALANCE POST 9/11
Two laws significantly changed FISA and FISC in the
wake of 9/11. First, in 2001, Congress enacted the PATRIOT
59
Act, which expanded the scope of information subject to FISA
60
61
orders. Second, in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA),
Congress created a statutory regime for collecting foreign intelligence information, which was previously governed by execu62
tive order. Together, these changes opened the door for the
executive branch to expand the scope of signals intelligence—or
electronic communications and business records about those
63
communications—collected. Each statutory change will be addressed in turn.

56. The Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel relied on the individual warrant requirement to establish FISA/FISC’s conformity with Article
III of the Constitution.
57. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 101(e)(1)(A) (defining
“foreign intelligence information”).
58. Id. § 101(e)(1).
59. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
60. As will be discussed later, it was a broad view of the term “relevant”
that led FISC to secretly rule that the PATRIOT Act permitted bulk collection
of metadata.
61. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801 (2008)).
62. See generally Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117,
144–53 (2015) [hereinafter Donohue, Section 702] (describing the evolution of
the FISA Amendments Act).
63. Signals intelligence is the information captured pursuant to current
programmatic surveillance. See Nat’l Research Council, Bulk Collection of
Signals Intelligence: Technical Options S-2 (2015) (prepublication copy).
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The PATRIOT Act modified various provisions of FISA and
64
expanded the scope of information subject to FISC warrants.
Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the government could request business records solely from common carriers if and only if the government provided “specific and articulable facts” that the person the records pertained to was a “foreign power or agent of a
65
foreign power.” Under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, the
FBI could now apply to FISC for an order permitting “the production of any tangible thing[]” (not only business records) from
66
any business (not only common carriers). Moreover, while the
government previously had to show that the subject of the
business records request was a foreign power or its agent, the
new law permitted the government to obtain any tangible thing
so long as there were reasonable grounds to believe it was “rel67
evant” to an authorized investigation. The “foreign power/agent of a foreign power” requirement was similarly replaced
with a mere “relevance” standard for Pen Register and Trap
and Trace orders, which allow the government to track num68
bers calling in or from a given phone number. These changes
reduced FISC’s ability to thoroughly examine and question the
government’s need for a given search warrant.
Although the PATRIOT Act seemingly retained the requirement of individualized court orders, the administration
64. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amended 50 U.S.C. § 1861 and expanded the ability of intelligence agencies to obtain information from businesses. USA PATRIOT Act § 215 (permitting the FBI to request the production of “any tangible thing[]”). Prior to the PATRIOT Act, Congress amended
various provisions of FISA to cover: (1) physical searches, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423,
3445 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829 (1994)); (2) pen-trap and
trace devises, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No.
105-272, § 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–10 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1841–1846 (1998)); and (3) searches of business records, id. § 602. See generally Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 793–802 (2014) [hereinafter Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection] (describing evolution of FISA and
the metadata collection program).
65. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 § 602.
66. USA PATRIOT Act § 501 (emphasis added) (expanding the definition
of “business record” to include “any tangible things (including books, records,
papers, documents, and other items)”); see Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection,
supra note 64, at 797–98.
67. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 § 505.
68. Id. § 404(c)(2) (requiring the government to certify that the “information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or
international terrorism investigation”); see 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012) (defining
pen register); id. § 3127(4) (defining trap and trace device).
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ignored that requirement. Relying on the President’s “inherent”
constitutional authority, the executive branch engaged in “bulk
collection” of both phone and Internet metadata without any
69
involvement of the FISA Court. Eventually, to salvage these
programs, the administration sought to bring them under the
auspices of FISA and the FISA Court, arguing that the term
70
“relevant” justified mass collection of phone and Internet data.
In decisions that remained confidential until Snowden’s disclosures, FISC accepted this seemingly limitless interpretation of
71
the word “relevant.” Indeed, a 2013 FISC decision went so far
as to hold that all Americans’ phone records were relevant to
authorized international terrorism investigations because they
72
may be used in some unforeseen, future search.
The PATRIOT Act modified not only the scope of searchable material but also the standard applicable to obtaining surveillance authorization. Previously, the executive branch had to
establish that the “purpose” of the surveillance was to obtain
intelligence information. Courts interpreted the “purpose” language to mean “primary purpose,” requiring the government to
show that gathering foreign intelligence (rather than, say,
criminal prosecution) was the primary purpose of the surveil69. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
(Jan. 17, 2007) (explaining the administration’s position on the legality of the
Terrorist Surveillance Program); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 2008 (2012) [hereinafter OIG REPORT, SECTION 702];
SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 125 (describing the development of FISA
after September 11, 2001). After public exposure of that warrantless surveillance, the administration brought its mass surveillance program once again
before the FISC. See OIG REPORT, SECTION 702, supra, at 9–11.
70. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 12 (July 2, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702]. A separate type of information is also collected under Section 702, referred to as “upstream” collection. Rather than merely collecting
information to or from a given selector, upstream collection captures entire
transactions and communications travelling across the Internet “backbone,”
which may mention, but do not contain, the selector. See id.
71. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, slip
op. at 18–23 (FISA Ct. 2013), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
BR%2013-109%20Order-1.pdf; see also ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT 22
(2015) (explaining FISC’s interpretation of the word “relevance”).
72. In re Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 13-109,
slip op. at 28–29.
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73

lance. The PATRIOT Act amended FISA so that gathering intelligence only had to be a “significant purpose” of the surveil74
lance, and permitted law enforcement agencies to share in75
formation acquired through FISA searches. This change
permitted the executive branch to comingle law enforcement
and intelligence activities to a greater extent and inserted into
the statutory scheme the ambiguity inherent in the term “sig76
nificant.”
In 2008, Congress altered FISC’s role and relationship to
the executive branch once again through the FISA Act
Amendments, further eroding portions of FISA that codified the
Church Committee’s structural and procedural recommendations. Of particular relevance, Section 702 codified new procedures for targeting non-United States persons abroad. First,
the FAA eliminated the requirement for individual court orders, even if a United States citizen’s information would be collected, so long as the American was not the “target” of the sur77
veillance. The NSA then interpreted the FAA to permit not
73. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2012)).
74. Id.; see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)
(holding that FISA did not require the government to show that its primary
purpose in undertaking the surveillance was not criminal prosecution and that
the “significant purpose” test did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
75. USA PATRIOT Act § 203(b)(1) (“Any investigative or law enforcement
officer . . . who by any means authorized by this chapter, has obtained
knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or
evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal
law enforcement . . . official to the extent such contents include foreign intelligence . . . .”); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: PRESERVING
LIFE AND LIBERTY, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/what_is_the_patriot_
act.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (noting that the PATRIOT Act “facilitated
information sharing and cooperation among government agencies so that they
can better ‘connect the dots’”).
76. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate Gen.,
Nat’l Sec. Litig. & Intelligence Law, to Judge Advocates (Sept. 4, 2003),
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/navy0903.pdf (discussing the PATRIOT Act’s
changes to FISA). This potential for commingling intelligence and enforcement
activities led to abuse and misstatements to FISC regarding the scope of
FISC-approved searches. For example, one FISA certification erroneously
stated “that the target of the FISA [search] was not under criminal investigation.” In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (FISA Ct. 2002). This led the FISA Court to
“h[o]ld a special meeting to consider the troubling number of inaccurate FBI
affidavits in so many FISA applications.” Id.
77. However, “if an individual is not known to be a U.S. person . . . then
the NSA assumes that the individual is a non-U.S. person.” Donohue, Section
702, supra note 62, at 158 (emphasis added). Information about U.S. persons
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only acquiring information to and from targets of surveillance
but also information about targets of surveillance in certain
contexts, even if the communication was between two non78
foreign individuals. The FAA also required the government to
establish targeting and minimization procedures to reduce the
79
risk of capturing non-target communications. Unlike the original design of FISA, where FISC adjudicated individual warrant determinations before any targeting occurred, the FAA
transformed FISC into a meta-arbiter, approving generally applicable targeting and minimization procedures that applied af80
ter a search occurred.
The FAA also extended the scope of “foreign” targets falling
within FISC’s protection and jurisdiction. Whereas FISA originally limited intelligence agencies to collecting information
from “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers”—language
81
that intentionally tracked Keith —the FAA extended FISC jurisdiction to “any non-U.S. person overseas” so long as collecting that intelligence furthered the goals of collecting “foreign
82
intelligence.” Five years after its enactment, Congress reauthorized the FAA with little debate, despite senators previously
83
expressing concern over the scope of information collected.

could be acquired in a variety of other ways. For example, information could
be acquired when a U.S. person communicates with a non-U.S. person or when
two non-U.S. persons discuss a U.S. person. Also, given the complexity of the
collection program, sometimes a U.S. person would be “inadvertent[ly]” targeted. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702, supra note 70, at 6.
78. Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 161–64.
79. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a (2008)).
80. Id. For a detailed description of the evolution of the FAA and the
changes it made to FISA, see Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 124–53.
81. The Keith court expressly declined to opine on the government’s surveillance authority over “foreign powers or their agents.” United States v. U.S.
District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321–22 (1972) (“We have not addressed,
and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”).
82. Id.
83. See Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 156–57. As chronicled by
national security scholar Laura Donohue, by 2012,
[M]ore than a dozen senators had joined a letter to Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, expressing alarm that the intelligence community ha[d] stated that ‘it is not reasonably possible to
identify the number of people located inside the United States whose
communications may have been reviewed’ under the FAA.
Id.
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The PATRIOT Act and FAA represented a step back from
the Church Committee’s structural and procedural recommendations. First, the Committee noted that intelligence agencies
need specific and restricted statutory mandates—the potential
for abuse of intelligence authority is too great when agencies
84
operate under “fuzzy” and “ambiguous” directives. However,
after 9/11, the warrant parameters were ambiguous: rather
than being tied to foreign powers and their agents, searches
just had to be “relevant” to “foreign intelligence” investigations;
rather than authorizing searches for the primary purpose of
85
national security, that purpose just had to be “significant.” Second, the Committee recognized that, to the extent possible, in86
telligence agencies need continuous oversight. However, after
9/11, the FISA Court had to take the government’s word that a
given search was “relevant” to a foreign intelligence investigation, and the court no longer pre-approved warrants before a
search, but rather approved general procedures to apply after
87
intelligence agencies gathered information. These statutory
changes represented a return to pre-Church Committee processes and tipped the scale once again toward “security” at the
expense of “liberty.”
D. THE SNOWDEN DISCLOSURES AND FREEDOM ACT
The PATRIOT Act and FAA, together with confidential
statutory and constitutional interpretation on the part of the
FISA Court, provided intelligence agencies with the necessary
fodder to act with impunity like pre-Church agencies. Intelligence agencies conducted expansive searches and collected vast
amounts of private information, all without the public’s
knowledge. That veil of secrecy fell in June of 2013, when Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor and CIA employee,
began releasing classified information about NSA surveillance

84. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
85. The 9/11 Commission, for example, found that intelligence agencies
acted with “little guidance” from Congress in the wake of 9/11 and evolving
national security threats. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 15–16 (2004), http://www.9-11commission
.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf.
86. See id. at 25–26.
87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. FISC still approves individualized warrants, but this Article focuses on post-9/11 changes to FISC’s
jurisdiction.
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88

activities. Among other things, Snowden disclosed a sweeping
FISC opinion, in which FISC ordered Verizon Communications
to furnish all telephone metadata to the NSA once a day under
89
the auspices of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Regardless of
whether Snowden is considered a whistleblower or a traitor, he
catalyzed a conversation about government secrecy, as a result
90
of which Congress enacted the FREEDOM Act.
On June 2, 2015, one day after the expiration of Section
91
215, Congress enacted the FREEDOM Act, for the purpose of
“prohibit[ing] bulk collection of records under Section 215 of the
92
USA PATRIOT Act.” Among other things, the Act requires
93
FISC to publish opinions in certain circumstances and estab94
lishes a system for the appointment of amicus curiae. According to the House Judiciary Report, “[t]he Act creates a new program for the targeted collection of telephone metadata,
provides greater privacy and civil liberties protections for
Americans, expands existing congressional oversight provisions, and creates greater transparency of national security
95
programs operated pursuant to FISA.” The FREEDOM Act
does accomplish each of the aforementioned goals—but, given
the status quo before its enactment, saying that it “improves”
liberty protections and congressional oversight is not, by itself,
96
saying too much.
88. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order;
see also Tom McCarthy, Edward Snowden Identifies Himself as Source of NSA
Leaks—As It Happened, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://www
.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/nsa-secret-surveillance-lawmakers-live.
89. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2 (2015); Ian Black, NSA Spying
Scandal: What We Have Learned, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2013, 2:48 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/10/nsa-spying-scandal-what-we
-have-learned; see also In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for
an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR
06-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006). The NSA collected information from not only
Verizon but also other U.S. telecommunications providers. See H.R. REP. NO.
114-109, pt. 1, at 8.
90. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2–10 (describing the background
of, and the need for, legislation).
91. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring
Effective Discipline over Monitoring (FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11423, 129 Stat. 268 (2015).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2.
93. See FREEDOM Act § 402.
94. See id. § 401.
95. H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 2.
96. Throughout the remainder of this Article we will note where the
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II. INFRINGEMENTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
THE NAME OF SECURITY
As discussed in Part I, the PATRIOT Act and FAA inserted
ambiguity and expansive executive authority—two characteristics the Church Committee recognized contributed to executive
overreach—into FISA’s framework. Both the intelligence community, exercising wide-ranging investigative authority, and
the FISA Court, avoiding questioning executive action in the
delicate area of national security, embraced this ambiguity and
newly sanctioned authority. Those structural changes set society up for another pre-Church Committee moment, particularly
when coupled with unnecessary secrecy and a culture of impunity.
This Part explores the impact the PATRIOT Act and FAA
had on civil liberties. Lessons learned by the Church Committee and memorialized in FISA were quickly forgotten in the
wake of the “War on Terror.” Because of statutory changes to
FISA, intelligence agencies were in a position to broadly construe “foreign intelligence” and other ambiguous statutory
terms, and to permit a desire for national security to infringe
upon citizens’ constitutional liberties. Although we lack a comprehensive report detailing executive overreach, there remains
evidence of misuse of executive authority, and we can infer additional, unknown infringements on constitutional liberties are
occurring.
Drawing from the findings of the Church Committee and
intent of FISA’s drafters, this Part discusses where Congress,
intelligence agencies, and the FISA Court strayed from the
original design of FISA and FISC. Section A begins by analyzing the bulk collection of individual metadata, via both phone
and Internet searches. These programs emerged from the PATRIOT Act and were sanctioned by questionable, and secret,
statutory interpretation on the part of the FISA Court. Section
B discusses FISC’s role post-FAA as an adjudicator of procedures as opposed to individual cases and controversies. Section
C pulls back from specific FISC holdings and discusses the culture of impunity that flourished in the wake of 9/11. This culture pervaded the relationship between intelligence agencies
and FISC—with intelligence agencies misleading FISC as to
the scope of intelligence programs and violating the (limited)
FREEDOM Act has the potential to significantly rein in intelligence overreach
and also where the Act is ambiguous enough to leave the door open, once
again, for abuse and misuse of executive authority.
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restrictions the court imposed on those programs. Finally, Section D suggests that all these potential constitutional violations
continued until Snowden’s disclosures because of a culture of
secrecy and the de minimis potential for collateral review.
First, the executive branch increased its invocation of, and expanded the scope of, the state secrets doctrine, precluding judicial review of FISA-related information in public Article III
courts. Second, FISC engaged in significant confidential statutory and constitutional interpretation. Combined, these actions
have encroached upon constitutionally protected civil liberties
and undermined public trust in the government.
A. BULK COLLECTION
After 9/11, intelligence agencies began engaging in bulk
97
collection of phone and Internet “metadata” —information
about the telephone numbers dialed, e-mail addresses contacted, and the time and length of calls/e-mails, as opposed to the
98
content of a communication. Although this collection initially
took place without judicial authorization, the FISA Court—via
confidential opinions—ultimately approved the bulk collection
of both telephone and Internet data. These rulings placed “few
limits on the government’s ability to collect and retain large
amounts of domestic and international telephone records,” but
did slightly limit the government’s ability to “search or make
99
further use of the collected metadata.”
The FISA Court held that the collection of telephone and
Internet metadata is both statutorily—under a broad interpretation of the term “relevance”—and constitutionally author-

97. The term “bulk” is used to distinguish from the “narrower collection of
metadata pertaining to an identified individual or group of individuals.” LIU
ET AL., supra note 54, at 2. See id. for a general discussion of the bulk collection program.
98. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 21. For a detailed discussion
of how much information is obtained from metadata, see Klayman v. Obama,
957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the quantity of information
that is now available and, more importantly, what that information can tell
the Government about people’s lives.”).
99. LIU ET AL., supra note 54, at 3. The limitation on the executive’s authority to search the metadata was scant. First, it only required “reasonable
articulable suspicion” (RAS)—a lesser standard than probable cause. Id. at 4.
Second, it was the agency itself (“a relatively small group of NSA personnel”)
that determined whether RAS existed to search a particular query. Id. After
the Snowden disclosures, however, President Obama asked FISC to make the
RAS determination. See id.
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ized. In particular, the court held that metadata “is not protected by the Fourth Amendment because users of e-mail [and
telephones] do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy” of
“non-content addressing information,” since that information is
101
shared with third-party providers, such as Verizon. The court
admitted, however, that it was interpreting FISA to “encompass an exceptionally broad form of collection,” and that such
an interpretation may not have been appropriate under FISA
102
before the PATRIOT Act. Essentially, “[b]y 2007, the FISA
[C]ourt and Congress had together, and mostly in secret,
103
broadened FISA into a bulk surveillance statute.”
The public remained unaware of this bulk collection until
Edward Snowden exposed the NSA’s activities in 2013. Once
exposed to the public, however, civil society—and, to a lesser
extent, Congress—began mobilizing against the bulk collection
of metadata. Multiple bills were proposed in Congress that
104
would curtail the program, which expired on June 1, 2015.
Before Congress acted, however, the Second Circuit issued an
opinion striking down the bulk collection under Section 215 on
105
statutory, rather than constitutional, grounds. The court held
that the government read the term “relevant”—added to FISA
106
by the PATRIOT Act—far too broadly, reasoning that the

100. The FISA Court held that “[i]nformation is ‘relevant’ to an authorized
international terrorism investigation if it bears upon, or is pertinent to, that
investigation.” In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13109, slip. op. at 18 (FISA Ct. Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/BR%2013-109%20Order-1.pdf (quoting Government’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certain Tangible Things for Investigations To Protect Against Int’l Terrorism, No. BR 05-06, at 13–14 (filed May
23, 2006)). Although the bulk collection of telephone metadata received greater
media attention, the reasoning for that opinion came largely from a prior opinion authorizing bulk collection of Internet metadata. See GOITEIN & PATEL,
supra note 71.
101. Internet Metadata Opinion and Order, No. PR-TT [REDACTED], slip
op. at 19 (FISA Ct. 2006), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/
CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf; see also id. at 58–61 (explaining the court’s determination that the surveillance complied with the Fourth Amendment).
102. Id. at 23.
103. Schlanger, supra note 5.
104. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 3 (2015) (describing the background of the FREEDOM Act and noting that “various recommendations” for
reform were proposed before the Act was passed).
105. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
106. See id. at 812 (rejecting the government’s argument that metadata is
relevant if it “may allow the NSA, at some unknown time in the future, utiliz-
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government cannot “collect phone records only because they
may become relevant to a possible authorized investigation in
107
the future.” The panel recognized that to hold otherwise
would be conceding limitless authority to the NSA under Sec108
tion 215.
In response to the Second Circuit’s decision and mounting
public pressure, Congress enacted the FREEDOM Act, which
technically eliminated Section 215’s authorization of “bulk col109
lection” of metadata. The FREEDOM Act, however, was ambiguous as to whether bulk collection could continue during a
110
180-day transition period. In June, the FISA Court disagreed
with the Second Circuit’s statutory interpretation, held that the
program was statutorily authorized, and permitted its contin111
ued use during the FREEDOM Act’s transition period.
The bulk collection of information is a troubling departure
from the original intent of Congress in enacting FISA against
the immediate backdrop of the Church Committee’s findings
and recommendations. This bulk collection represented a return to pre-Church Committee government practices. Under
the auspices of broad and ambiguous language, intelligence
agencies were free to collect vast amounts of information about
citizens without the individualized protections of the Fourth
ing its ability to sift through the trove of irrelevant data it has collected up to
that point, to identify information that is relevant”).
107. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
108. See id.
109. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 114-109, pt. 1, at 5–9 (2015) (describing
the need for legislation). Enacting the FREEDOM Act was no simple task and
highlights the controversies often associated with regulating the relationship
between security and personal liberties. Congress was unable to enact a law
by the time Section 215 technically expired. The delays resulted in part from a
filibuster by Senator Rand Paul, who argued that the FREEDOM Act did not
do enough to protect liberty and privacy. See Jeremy Diamond, Rand Paul
Wraps 10-Hour “Filibuster” over NSA Surveillance Program, CNN (May 21,
2015, 7:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/rand-paul-filibuster
-patriot-act-nsa-surveillance.
110. See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, slip op. at 10 (FISA Ct.
June 29, 2015) (acknowledging that there was a question as to “whether Congress has authorized bulk acquisition of call detail records during the [FREEDOM Act’s] interim 180-day period”).
111. See id. at 9–11. The court stated that “Second Circuit rulings are not
binding on the FISC, and this Court respectfully disagrees with that Court’s
analysis.” Id. at 14–15; see also Charles Savage, Surveillance Court Rules that
N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-rules-nsa-can
-resume-bulk-data-collection.html.
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112

Amendment. Bulk collection is at odds with FISA’s original
intent in two ways in particular. First, it puts FISC in the position of approving broad searches, as opposed to individual warrant applications in concrete and limited cases and controversies. Such broad approvals are not a common characteristic of
Article III courts. Second, bulk collection increases the possibility of the misuse of information. FISC itself recognized, and attempted to rein in, the intelligence community’s misuse of the
113
diverse material collected.
Congress did attempt to address these diversions from
FISA’s original intent in the FREEDOM Act. In an attempt to
rein in the “bulk collection” of metadata exposed by Snowden,
the FREEDOM Act supplements the ambiguous “relevance”
standard by requiring that a “specific selection term” be used as
114
the basis for the production of “tangible things” and “pen reg115
ister” searches. It remains to be seen, however, whether the
FREEDOM Act significantly limits the potential for encroachment on First and Fourth Amendment protections and the

112. For example, the FAA expanded the scope of foreigners that the government could target. The government did not have to show it was targeting a
“foreign power” or an “agent of a foreign power,” the very key words invoked
by the Keith Court and used elsewhere in FISA. Instead, the government could
target any non-U.S. person overseas for the purpose of collecting “foreign intelligence information.” See supra notes 62, 81–83 and accompanying text.
113. See infra Part II.C. But cf. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT
BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 9–10 (Jan. 23, 2014) [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215] (finding that “compliance issues” resulted
from the complexity and scope of the program, rather than bad faith actions of
program administrators).
114. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 103, 129 Stat. 268, 272 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2015)).
115. Id. § 201. It is particularly concerning that the “relevance” standard
remains in the FREEDOM Act. As discussed above, the bulk collection program emerged from exceedingly broad interpretations of the relevance standard. Although the Second Circuit has rejected FISC’s interpretation of “relevant,” see Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015),
both FISC and the executive branch have made it clear that they prefer FISC’s
interpretation to the Second Circuit’s, see Memorandum of Law of the United
States, In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75 (FISA Ct.
June 2, 2015), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Misc%2015-01%
20Memorandum%20of%20Law.pdf (arguing that the government should be
able to continue collecting bulk data during the FREEDOM Act’s transition
period, despite the Second Circuit’s decision in ACLU v. Clapper).
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116

misuse of private information. The definition of “specific selection term” is broad enough to include entire Internet Proto117
col (IP) addresses. Thus, the government may acquire information that hundreds or thousands of non-foreign targets
visited a given IP address. The Act also permits collections of
information “two hops” away from an original target—what
some refer to as “bulky” data—and creates a new phone
metadata program that allows the NSA to continuously collect
the phone records, not only of suspected terrorists, but of eve118
ryone with whom they are in contact. In the FREEDOM Act,
Congress addressed a symptom of post-9/11 changes to FISA,
but did not address the underlying structural wrongs that permitted that symptom to come to fruition—Congress replaced
one broad and ambiguous statutory directive with another.
B. BULK ADJUDICATION
An issue related to the bulk collection of information,
which occurred in part because of broad and ambiguous statutory language, is the process by which that collection is ap119
proved. The most troubling post-9/11 procedural change is the
120
FAA’s (potentially unintentional ) amendments to the warrant
116. See generally David Cole, The New America: Little Privacy, Big Terror,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 13, 2015 (noting that the FREEDOM Act did not address myriad issues, including “the NSA’s practices of collecting enormous
amounts of personal data on and communications of foreigners overseas [(Section 702)], even when they are communicating with Americans”).
117. In an earlier version of the FREEDOM Act proposed in the Senate, the
“specific selection term” would have had to “narrowly limit the scope of tangible things sought to the greatest extent reasonably practicable.” S. 2685, 113th
Cong. § 107(k)(3) (2014). That language was not adopted by the House.
118. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 29. Given that there
is no known instance where the bulk collection “program made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation,” we should be particularly suspect of any new program that strays beyond actual criminal or
terrorist suspects. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The PCLOB also found that
there was only “one instance over the past seven years [when] the program
arguably contributed to the identification of an unknown terrorism suspect,”
and the FBI would likely have identified that individual even without the use
of bulk data collection. Id. The report’s findings were based on access to “classified briefings and documentation.” Id.
119. That is, assuming the executive branch invokes the FISA Court’s jurisdiction and the FISA Court approves that bulk collection.
120. During congressional debates on the FAA, multiple members of
Congress made statements suggesting that the FAA would still require individualized warrants for any surveillance that may implicate a United States
citizen. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S6379 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Cardin) (“FISA requires the Government to seek an order or warrant
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application procedure. Prior to 2008, FISA required FISC to
approve individualized warrant applications before a given
search occurred, consistent with the recommendations of the
121
Church Committee. After 9/11, the executive branch argued
that such an individualized requirement was no longer practicable given evolutions in technology and the nature of foreign
enemies, and engaged in bulk collection of metadata without
the knowledge or approval of FISC. Section 702 of the FAA attempted to appease those executive concerns and permitted the
executive branch to collect “foreign intelligence” information, so
long as FISC approved “targeting” and “minimization” procedures, intended to minimize the unlawful collection of infor122
mation about United States citizens. Those procedures are
not applied on individual bases, but rather to “tens of thousands of cases involving [at least] hundreds of millions of com123
munications” annually.
Bulk adjudication of this sort is foreign to Article III
courts. The FAA eliminated the role of the factual nuances and
intricacies that are inherent in warrant proceedings. Under
Section 702, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence certify that general categories of information collected serve to “acquire foreign intelligence information” without
124
specifying who will be targeted. Although the FISA Court
does review, and has the power to amend, the government’s

from the FISA Court before conducting electronic surveillance that may involve U.S. persons.” (emphasis added)); 154 CONG. REC. H5763 (daily ed. June
20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Heather Wilson) (stating that the FAA would
“protect the civil liberties of Americans and continue to require individualized
warrants for anyone in the United States or American citizens anywhere in
the world”); see also Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 175 (collecting
statements).
121. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 324–26 (describing authorized investigative techniques); see also supra notes 12–13 and
accompanying text (describing the importance of certain processes occurring
before a search). The Church Committee explicitly stated that the executive
branch lacks authority to “target[] . . . an American for electronic surveillance
without a warrant.” CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 325.
122. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 26.
123. Id. at 29. Similar bulk adjudications have been approved by the FISA
Court under Section 215. See, e.g., Internet Metadata Opinion and Order, No.
PR-TT [REDACTED], slip op. at 69–71 (FISA Ct. 2006), http://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (describing the procedures the
NSA must follow when engaging in bulk collection of Internet metadata).
124. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702, supra note 70, at 6.
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125

targeting and minimization procedures, the FISA Court cannot review the government’s certification that a “targeting”
126
procedure serves a “foreign intelligence” purpose. This is particularly problematic because of the arguably tenuous relationship between “foreign intelligence” and the information collected. Collecting “foreign intelligence” does not even need to be the
primary purpose of the search—it is sufficient if the infor127
mation “relates to” national security. Because of the deference the court must give the executive branch regarding the
factual aspect of a “foreign intelligence purpose,” the lack of a
limiting judicial or statutory definition of that term is trou128
bling. As noted by the Church Committee, “foreign intelli129
gence” is an exceedingly broad and malleable term, and has
been utilized by intelligence agencies to expand their power
130
and authority beyond its intended scope.

125. See id. “The minimization procedures cover the acquisition, retention,
use, and dissemination of any non-publicly available U.S. person information
acquired through the Section 702 program.” Id. at 7.
126. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 41. Particularly troubling is that
under current NSA targeting and minimization procedures, a United States
citizen can be used as an identifier, so long as the search satisfies the other
Section 702 prerequisites. See Memorandum Opinion, No. [REDACTED], slip
op. at 22–23 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/
October-2011-Bates-Opinion-and%20Order-20140716.pdf; see also GOITEIN &
PATEL, supra note 71, at 41.
127. See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 27.
128. FISA’s definition of “foreign intelligence” is nearly limitless:
“Foreign intelligence information” means—
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States
person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against—(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts
of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage,
international terrorism, or the international proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or (C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of
a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to—(A) the national defense or the security of the
United States; or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the
United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2012).
129. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 302.
130. See id. at 4. Section 702’s language also differs from the remainder of
FISA, which requires searches to pertain to a “foreign power” or “agent of a
foreign power”—language that had its genesis in the Supreme Court’s Keith
opinion. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
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FISC’s actions under Section 702 do not resemble the most
fundamental roles of Article III courts—judges, adjudicating an
individual case or controversy, which is capable of redressing a
wrong or protecting a right. FISC is not even approving a specific search, as it at least arguably did (and under the FREEDOM Act is more likely to do) with regard to the approval of
bulk data collection. Rather, Section 702 turns FISC into a meta-arbiter of mere search techniques, as opposed to the adjudi131
cator of a specific search request. And FISC lacks the authority to question the most fundamental finding in a 702 request—
whether the procedures serve “foreign intelligence” interests. It
is thus very questionable whether Section 702 comports with
Article III of the Constitution.
These bulk adjudications are also the antithesis of the procedures envisioned by Congress and relied upon by the Justice
Department in 1978 to justify FISA’s constitutionality. Whether FISC comported with Article III was a subject of debate in
1978. The Act satisfied Article III on the margins because at
least the court adjudicated an actual “case,” similar to a neutral
magistrate in warrant proceedings. After the FAA, however,
the court no longer determines the President’s “authority to
conduct electronic surveillance of a particular target . . . [by]
132
apply[ing] standards of law to the facts of a particular case.”
Rather, the FISA Court applies general and ambiguous statutory language to (almost always) give judicial credence to intelligence agency procedures in the absence of specific information
about the search targets. Notably, the FREEDOM Act did not
amend the Section 702 program, except to the extent it limited
bulk collection of Internet data to “specific selector terms.”
Similar to the bulk collection discussed in Section A, the
bulk adjudication represented a step back from the processes
recommended by the Church Committee. The FAA placed more
unchecked authority in the hands of intelligence agencies, and
did so through ambiguous and broad directives. The structural
changes that opened the door to bulk adjudication and bulk col131. As stated by Laura Donohue, “[FISC] in some ways thus appears to be
acting in the capacity of an oversight body, generally ensuring that procedures
are in place and asking the NSA to police itself.” Donohue, Section 702, supra
note 62, at 195.
132. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794,
H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 27–28 (1978) [hereinafter
Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Hearings] (statement of John M.
Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel).
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lection paved the way for intelligence agencies to exceed their
apparent authority. Similar to the pre-Church Committee era,
133
“ambiguous laws and fuzzy instructions,” minimal oversight,
and changing technology opened the door to executive overreach.
C. A CULTURE OF IMPUNITY
Although we lack a comprehensive Senate report, there is
evidence that the post-9/11 era greatly resembled executive actions in the pre-Church Committee era. Like practices uncovered by the Church Committee, after 9/11, executive agencies
targeted individuals for their political opinions and blurred the
line between foreign intelligence and national law enforcement.
A similar culture of impunity seemingly flourished thanks to
ambiguous statutory directives, minimal oversight, and pervasive secrecy.
President George W. Bush’s “Terrorist Surveillance Program” exemplified the intelligence community’s culture of impunity, operating at the highest levels of administration. Despite Congress’s generous post-9/11 legislation, the Bush
administration engaged in secret, warrantless electronic surveillance within the United States. The President’s Terrorist
Surveillance Program authorized the NSA to intercept commu134
nications of individuals “linked to” Al-Qaeda. After the New
York Times reported leaked information about the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, the administration had to retroactively
justify its actions. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales couched
the program—and the administration’s failure to seek FISC
approval—in the need for “speed and agility” when responding
135
to Al-Qaeda. The Bush administration posited that the President possessed inherent constitutional authority “to order warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance within the United
133. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 5; see CHURCH COMM. REPORT,
BOOK II, supra note 8, at 169–72 (describing the effect inadequate statutory
guides had on the overbreadth of intelligence gathering).
134. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Pat Roberts and John D. Rockefeller, IV, Senate Select
Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and Peter Hoekstra and Jane Harmon,
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec.
22, 2005) (describing “legal authority” supporting the NSA’s collection activities).
135. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales to Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter,
supra note 69, at 1; see also Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts
et al., supra note 134, at 5 (“FISA could not have provided the speed and agility required for the early warning detection system.”).

2280

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:2251

States,” citing a classified FISC decision, the (ambiguous) Keith
case, and Justice White’s concurrence in Katz—shaky authority, to say the least, for such a sweeping constitutional interpre136
tation.
The President’s reliance on “inherent authority” was at
odds with FISA’s text and legislative history. The Church
Committee Domestic Task Force’s first two formal recommendations stated: (1) “[t]here is no inherent constitutional authority for the President or any intelligence agency to violate the
law,” and (2) “[n]o executive directive or order may be issued
which would conflict with [] statutes” implementing the Committee’s recommendations with regard to “federal domestic se137
curity activities.” Codifying the Church Committee’s recommendation, FISA specifies that it provides the “exclusive
means” by which domestic electronic surveillance for national
138
security purposes can be conducted. A Senate Report stated
that the “exclusive means” statement should “put[] to rest the
notion that Congress recognizes an inherent Presidential power
139
to conduct surveillance in the United States.” Eventually,
parts of the Terrorist Surveillance Program evolved into Section 702, one of the broadest and most ambiguous grants of ex140
ecutive authority under FISA today. The evolution from the
Terrorist Surveillance Program to Section 702 is a paradigmatic example of executive overreach and secrecy breeding further
overreach.
Overreach occurred within the confines of FISC’s jurisdiction as well, often because the government interpreted FISC’s
141
orders in a way that “strain[ed] credulity.” Despite amend136. Letter from William E. Moschella to Pat Roberts et al., supra note
134, at 2.
137. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 293, 297.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2012). FISA built upon Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (1968)), which established rules for
domestic government wiretaps, but did not explicitly govern wiretaps related
to national security.
139. BIRCH BAYH, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, S. REP. NO.
95-701, at 71–72 (1978) (emphasis added).
140. See PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 702, supra note 70, at 5–6. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court reinterpreted FISA and gave life to the program once again after President George W. Bush’s attorney general refused to
reauthorize the program “based on the president’s bare say-so.” Schlanger, supra note 5.
141. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13,
slip op. at 5 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009).
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ments to FISA that substantially broadened the NSA’s ability
142
to collect telephone and Internet communications, the NSA
repeatedly violated—and exceeded the scope of—FISC orders.
In response to those violations, in 2009, FISC required the NSA
to submit its queries of bulk metadata on a “case-by-case basis,” even though the NSA itself had previously been determining whether it had “reasonable articulable suspicion” to search
143
the database. FISC enforced that case-by-case requirement
because of “NSA non-compliance with the FISC’s previous orders”—noncompliance that the Department of Justice, not the
144
145
NSA, reported to FISC. Even after the 2009 “sanction” of
actually submitting individualized search queries to FISC, the
NSA once again arguably exceeded its court authorization. The
NSA misrepresented to FISC the extent of its Internet communication collections, sparking one FISC judge to state that
“[t]he Court is troubled that the government’s revelations regarding NSA’s acquisition of Internet transaction mark the
third instance in less than three years in which the government
has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding the
146
scope of a major collection program.”
On Christmas Eve of 2014, in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, the NSA released a “heavily-redacted”
report, which summarized the misuse of information and
147
search technology from 2001 to 2013. The agency stated that

142. Even FISC’s interpretations “push statutory language to its limit.” See
Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 122.
143. LIU ET AL., supra note 54, at 4–5.
144. Id. at 5; see also In re Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, at 18–
20.
145. It is interesting that limiting FISC to its original role in national security-related search proceedings was considered a “sanction.”
146. Memorandum Opinion, No. [REDACTED], slip. op. at 16 n.14 (FISA
Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates
-Opinion-and%20Order-20140716.pdf.
147. David Lerman, U.S. Spy Agency Reports Improper Surveillance of
Americans, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2014-12-24/spy-agency-to-release-reports-documenting
-surveillance-errors. It is hard to believe that releasing the documents on
Christmas Eve was unintentional. Perhaps the NSA hoped that individuals
would be on holidays, paying less attention to the news cycle. This possibility
was noted by more than one news agency, one of which stated that the NSA
released the report “[w]ith little fanfare,” “quietly publish[ing] a trove of declassified data.” Javier E. David, NSA Declassified Reports Showing US Privacy Breaches, CNBC (Dec. 27, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/27/
nsa-declassified-reports-showing-inadvertent-us-surveillance.html; see also
Nicky Woolf, ACLU Accuses NSA of Using Holiday Lull To “Minimise Impact”
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the “vast majority of compliance incidents involve unintention148
al technical or human error.” Unsurprisingly—given FISC’s
role as approver of general retention techniques but not individualized searches—some acquisition of information about
United States persons occurred because of “overly broad or
149
poorly constructed database queries.” There were also instances, however, of “intentional misuse” of the bulk collection
150
systems. These examples of “intentional misuse” of information are similar to those uncovered by the Church Commit151
tee.
Although there is evidence of abusive use of surveillance,
that evidence is arguably not as extreme as that uncovered by
the Church Committee—there is not as much evidence of the
extreme practices of using surveillance to disrupt social justice
of Documents, GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2014/dec/26/aclu-nsa-documents-christmas-eve-lessens-impact.
148. NSA Reports to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB),
NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/Intelligence
OversightBoard.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
149. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, REPORT TO THE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
ON NSA ACTIVITIES—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 2 (Mar. 4, 2013). The
number of searches that were “overly broad” is redacted from the report, making it difficult to assess the average accuracy of NSA searches. See id.
150. NSA Reports to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), supra note 148.
151. See generally supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text. The Church
Committee found that “intelligence agencies [] frequently wiretapped and
bugged American citizens without the benefit of judicial warrant,” CHURCH
COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 12, permitting “the Government to
generate vast amounts of information—unrelated to any legitimate government interest—about the personal and political lives of American citizens,”
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, U.S. SENATE, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, SEN.
REP. NO. 94-755, BOOK III, at 332 (1976). Since 9/11, the NSA has likewise retained wholly domestic e-mails obtained incidentally, including e-mails that
contain information about U.S. persons, and retained that information just
“because the information may prove relevant in the future.” GOITEIN & PATEL,
supra note 71, at 38. This broad array of information has allegedly been used
in ways that infringe on the protected First and Fourth Amendment rights of
individuals and organizations. The Church Committee also found that intelligence agencies targeted domestic groups and individuals, including civil rights
organizations and Martin Luther King, Jr. See, e.g., CHURCH COMM. REPORT,
BOOK II, supra note 8, at 51–53. Civil rights organizations today are likewise
concerned with unauthorized searches of their private information, resulting
in a chilling of their First Amendment rights. See generally Brief for Nat’l
Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644
(6th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-2095, 06-2140).
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152

movements and harass political outsiders. But that does not
mean the abuse is not occurring and that the potential for misuse of information is not chilling First Amendment-protected
153
expression. Snowden’s disclosures revealed that, post 9/11,
the NSA and FBI covertly monitored e-mails of prominent Muslim-Americans ranging from politicians to civil rights activ154
ists. Snowden disclosed that the administration deliberately
masked evidentiary trails to hide any evidence that originated
from a FISA warrant from criminal defendants (parallel construction), so that the FISA searches could not be challenged in
155
criminal proceedings. To assume more unconstitutional surveillance is not occurring is to ignore the lessons learned after
the Cold War—“[i]n time of crisis, the Government will exercise
its power to conduct domestic activities to the fullest extent.
The distinction between legal dissent and criminal conduct is
156
easily forgotten.”
The potential for the misuse of intelligence information is
particularly troubling because of the inextricable relationship
between intelligence and law enforcement. The PATRIOT Act
amended FISA to permit greater coordination between intelligence and law enforcement agencies while simultaneously expanding the scope of information subject to FISC-approved
157
searches. Under new standards, the NSA could conduct surveillance so long as it was a “significant”—as opposed to the

152. See, e.g., CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 10–13
(summarizing the Domestic Task Force’s findings on the use of illegal or improper means of covert action).
153. For a discussion of the ways in which United States persons have already changed their behavior to avoid federal surveillance of First Amendment protected expression, see Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www
.pewinternet.org/2015/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-snowden.
154. See Glenn Greenwald & Murtaza Hussain, Meet the Muslim-American
Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On, INTERCEPT (July 8, 2014,
11:01 PM), http://theintercept.com/2014/07/09/under-surveillance. Also, as discussed further below, there is the potential for misuse of NSA-acquired information by the FBI when conducting purely domestic law enforcement activities. See infra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, U.S. Direct Agents To Cover Up Program Used To Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:25
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805
(discussing governmental surveillance of domestic drug offenders).
156. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 289; see also id. at
291 (“The natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of power.”).
157. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1832(a)(7)(B) (2001)).
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158

primary—purpose of the search. This change in language led
some analysts to conclude that law enforcement may be the
159
primary purpose for a search. Further, the FBI can search
160
the bulk databases collected through FISC order. Because of
the NSA’s history of non-compliance with court minimization
procedures and broad, poorly worded queries, the FBI may then
access databases with information about United States citizens.
The FBI thus is able to end run the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment—the Supreme Court has made it clear that a warrant is required to conduct surveillance of Americans’ communications in cases that are not foreign intelligence investiga161
tions.
Thus, even if we assume every individual searching an
NSA database is searching for information to further “foreign
intelligence”—a dubious assumption given historical practices
by the intelligence community—information about United
States persons is vulnerable to collection and analysis in contravention of the Constitution. For persons who may have their
civil liberties violated due to an accidental broad query or an
intentional misuse of law enforcement power, there are few
ways to learn of those abuses and even fewer ways to challenge
them in a court.
D. BARRIERS TO COLLATERAL REVIEW
Despite the aforementioned issues currently plaguing ex
ante FISC authorization of intelligence gathering, it is incredibly difficult for the public to learn of intelligence gathering
practices and challenge them ex post. As a former FISC judge
publicly stated, unlike the subjects of traditional warrants, subjects of FISC searches are unlikely to learn of, let alone be able
to challenge, the information acquired by a FISC-approved
162
search. The government is supposed to notify criminal defendants if FISC-acquired evidence is used to build the gov-

158. Id.
159. For example, one reported breach occurred when an individual used
the signals intelligence system to locate someone believed to be kidnapped.
Woolf, supra note 147.
160. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 39.
161. See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316–18
(1972) (holding that, in general, the government must secure a warrant before
engaging in domestic electronic surveillance).
162. James G. Carr, A Better Secret Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/opinon/a-better-secret-court.html.
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163

ernment’s criminal case, but Snowden disclosed a policy of attempting to hide the trail of evidence that originated from a
164
FISC order. Furthermore, because the majority of foreign intelligence investigations never result in a criminal prosecution,
165
most targets are never notified that surveillance occurred.
Specific challenges to searches are difficult to mount, so it is
paramount that there is transparency in FISC proceedings so
that those most likely to be targeted may be able to satisfy Article III’s standing requirements. The Church Committee recognized that a culture of secrecy limited testing of intelligence
practices by Congress and the public, and contributed to executive overreach. Unnecessary secrecy, however, remains a key
component of post-9/11 intelligence practices. There are two
particular broad policies that currently limit more general challenges to surveillance—the expansion of the state secrets doctrine and FISC’s confidential constitutional and statutory interpretations.
1. The State Secrets Doctrine
One way in which the government has attempted to limit
challenges to programmatic surveillance and the collection of
citizens’ private information is through the invocation of the
166
“state secrets” doctrine, created in its modern form by the
167
Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds. In Reynolds, the
163. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d) (2012).
164. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
165. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that even
when a criminal prosecution is brought as a result of FISC-acquired evidence,
it remains difficult for the defendant to challenge that evidence. The government notice of FISC-collected evidence often does not include the basis of collection (who was the “foreign agent,” what statutory provision the search was
authorized under, etc.), leaving defense counsel unable to effectively bring a
motion to suppress the evidence. See Faiza Patel, How a Case of Stolen Corn
Seeds Shows the Problem with the FISA Court, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 1, 2015,
8:59 AM), http://www.justsecurity.org/21709/stolen-corn-seeds-problem-fisa
-court.
166. Very little is known “about how the executive branch actually uses the
privilege—who invokes it, under what circumstances it is invoked, how frequently it has been threatened, and to what end.” Laura K. Donohue, The
Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 79 (2010) [hereinafter
Donohue, State Secrets]. National security scholar Laura Donohue has, however, written a comprehensive and thoughtful article on the issue. Id. In that
article, she notes that the state secrets privilege has “played a significant role
in the executive branch’s national security litigation strategy.” Id. at 87.
167. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). For an overview of the Reynolds opinion, see
FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR., DEMOCRACY IN THE DARK: THE SEDUCTION OF
GOVERNMENT SECRECY 208–09 (2015).
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Court discussed a common-law privilege against revealing military or state secrets and held that courts should treat a document as privileged if an executive official certified that the doc168
Furthermore, the
ument contained sensitive information.
court should do so without reviewing the document to ensure
169
executive honesty when invoking that privilege. The three
Reynolds dissenters stated their support of the Third Circuit’s
opinion, which recognized the importance of courts as a check
170
on the constitutionality of executive and legislative action.
And those dissenters were correct to worry, since subsequent
courts “have viewed assertions of the privilege as a virtual ‘au171
tomatic win’ for the Government.” Despite the fact that Reynolds limited its remedy to treating a certain document as privileged, recent administrations have more expansively invoked
172
that privilege in litigation related to national security.
The state secrets doctrine has significantly expanded since
FISA’s enactment. As originally described in Reynolds, the
state secrets doctrine was a “privilege” used to shield internal
government documents that could expose “military matters”
173
that affect “national security” from public disclosure. However, recent administrations have invoked the doctrine as
174
grounds for dismissing entire lawsuits. In response, some
courts completely dismiss suits without adequate or logical ex175
planation, often incorrectly invoking the Totten doctrine—a
doctrine that precludes suits to enforce covert espionage

168. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
169. Id. at 7–8 (“The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”).
170. See id. at 12; see also Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.
1951).
171. See S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 5 (2008).
172. See id. at 3 (noting that “a strong public perception has emerged that
sees the privilege as a tool for Executive abuse”).
173. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9–10; see, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1139–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying
state secrets doctrine to shield CIA documents listing sources of intelligence
information from disclosure), aff’d, 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
174. See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing suit when plaintiff’s claims could not be litigated without disclosure of
secrets protected by the state secrets privilege); see also SCHWARZ, supra note
167, at 41. The state secrets doctrine has been invoked in four dozen cases
that stem from the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Donohue, State Secrets,
supra note 166, at 139–40.
175. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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agreements with the government. Whereas Totten does suggest a narrow ground of state secrets that may justify complete
dismissal of a suit, that narrow ground was not at issue in
Reynolds—a case that only discussed a privilege, not jurisdiction—and it is not apposite in most cases challenging FISC or177
ders.
Challenges remain even in those cases where courts
properly apply Reynolds. Even if courts do not dismiss the suit
solely based on “state secrets,” many suits are dismissed nonetheless on procedural and constitutional grounds. For example,
by precluding access to information collected under Section 702
and Section 215, the government is able to prevent plaintiffs
178
from obtaining the requisite documents to establish standing.
The state secrets doctrine is particularly problematic because there is a tendency for executive officials to invoke it not
to further national security, but instead to bury some embarrassing executive action. The Reynolds opinion itself—along
179
with subsequent cases such as Korematsu v. United States —
highlights the risk of inappropriate invocation of the state secrets doctrine. In Reynolds and Korematsu, respectively, there
is evidence that the executive branch misstated evidence to
hide its own negligence and misstated the extent of “secret” in180
formation to further an executive policy. More recently, the
state secrets doctrine has been invoked to preclude relief to in-

176. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 2, 8–11 (2005) (describing Totten as precluding any suit “where success depends upon the existence of [a] secret espionage relationship with the Government”).
177. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In Jeppesen, Judge Hawkins persuasively criticized
the majority’s description of the Totten doctrine, arguing that the doctrine was
wholly inapplicable where a claim was brought by third-party plaintiffs (not
government agents) against non-governmental defendants for tortious (not espionage-related) activities. Id. at 1096–97 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
178. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644,
653–57, 687–88 (6th Cir. 2007) (“But the plaintiffs do not—and because of the
State Secrets Doctrine cannot—produce any evidence that any of their own
communications have ever been intercepted by the NSA, under the [terrorist
surveillance program], or without warrants.”); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F.
Supp. 2d 899, 919–20 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“By successfully invoking the state secrets privilege, the government has foreclosed discovery that would allow the
plaintiffs to attempt to establish that they are suffering ongoing harm or will
suffer harm in the future.”).
179. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
180. See S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 5 (2008); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Access to Government Information Is a Foundation of American Democracy—But
the Courts Don’t Get It, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 645, 659–62 (2013).
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dividuals tortured by the Bush administration, even when the
arguably “confidential” information was already publicly dis181
“The privilege has . . . become part of a broader
closed.
framework through which the government tries to limit its vul182
nerability.” Without adequate “checks” by courts, there is a
significant risk that executive officials will continue “invoking
183
[state secrets] as a shield against embarrassing disclosures,”
thus “depriv[ing] the American people of their ability to judge
the effectiveness of their Government on national security mat184
ters.”
The executive branch’s invocation of the state secrets doctrine to preclude litigation exacerbates current issues plaguing
FISC. It provides a further means of insulation from review by
an Article III court other than the FISA Court. Non-FISA proceedings are an especially important means of challenging NSA
collection activities because of the actual adversity between two
parties, which is almost always lacking in the ex parte proceedings before FISC. Moreover, the drafters of FISA explicitly considered and drafted a provision addressing the relationship between information obtained via FISC-approved searches and
admissible evidence in non-FISC proceedings, leading one
185
judge to hold that FISA preempts the state secrets doctrine.
Under FISA, the district court may consider certain FISAacquired evidence “in camera and ex parte” if the Attorney
General files an affidavit “that disclosure or an adversary hear186
ing would harm the national security of the United States.”
181. See SCHWARZ, supra note 167, at 214–17.
182. Donohue, State Secrets, supra note 166, at 95. The state secrets doctrine has been invoked not only to limit the government’s vulnerability but also to protect—by extension and without any precedential support from Reynolds—private government contractors. Id. at 95–98.
183. Background on the State Secrets Privilege, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/
background-state-secrets-privilege (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
184. S. REP. NO. 110-442, at 10 (2008) (citing Press Release, Patrick Leahy,
U.S. Senate, Examining the State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving Accountability (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.leahy.senate
.gov/press/examining-the-state-secrets-privilege-protecting-national-security
-while-preserving-accountability).
185. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d
1109, 1117–25 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
186. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
§ 106(f), 92 Stat. 1783, 1794 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (1978)) (emphasis
added). “In practice, the government always files such an affidavit, and it appears that no defendant has ever obtained a copy of the government’s statement of probable cause or other documents that served as the basis for FISA
surveillance.” PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 176.
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Congress thought that a statutory procedure would better balance security and liberty interests than a common law rule de187
veloped by the courts. Notably, unlike Reynolds, FISA still
permits judges to review the allegedly sensitive evidence, and it
certainly does not suggest that the security-related evidence
can serve as the basis for complete dismissal of a lawsuit.
The state secrets doctrine has been expanding since FISA.
If anything, however, that doctrine should be contracting in the
post-FISA regime. FISC provides a confidential forum for adjudication, and FISA provides for in camera review of information
if the Attorney General so requests. At the very least, the state
secrets doctrine should not completely preclude litigants from
bringing suits challenging the government’s acquisition of information through FISC-approved searches. In 1978, Congress
attempted to establish a regime that would return separation of
powers principles to the collection of intelligence. Reviewing
certain information in camera still preserves separation of
powers principles because a court is actually reviewing the information, verifying the Attorney General’s invocation of protecting foreign intelligence information. However, if courts
permit the state secrets doctrine to completely prohibit lawsuits, there is no adequate check by the judiciary on the intelligence community. This contravenes the lessons learned by the
Church Committee and the delicate regime established by
FISA.
2. Confidential Constitutional and Statutory Interpretations
As the state secrets doctrine has expanded, simultaneously
has the scope of the orders issued by FISC. When originally enacted, FISC was supposed to be a court of limited jurisdiction,
solely possessing the authority to issue investigative subpoenas
before the government targeted an individual. Today, the FISA
Court routinely engages in confidential constitutional and stat187. The House report stated that FISA was intended to displace “uneven
and inconclusive” case law developed by courts regarding electronic surveillance and national security. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978). The report continued:
Moreover, the development of standards and restrictions by the judiciary with respect to electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes accomplished through case law threatens both civil liberties
and the national security because that development occurs generally
in ignorance of the facts, circumstances, and techniques of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance not present in the particular case before the court.
Id.
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utory interpretation. This shift not only departs from Congress’s original intent in 1978 but also prevents parties from
testing the government’s—and FISA Court’s—statutory and
constitutional interpretation in a well-briefed, reasoned, and
adversarial setting. Such adversarial challenges outside of
FISC proceedings are particularly unlikely because parties often lack notice of surveillance (and therefore the ability to bring
an as-applied challenge). More importantly, however, the vast
majority of surveillance conducted under Sections 215 and 702
will never find its way into any legal proceeding, criminal or
civil, where the statutory or constitutional interpretation could
188
potentially be uncovered and vetted.
Before the Snowden disclosures, the majority of FISC opinions interpreting FISA and its relationship to the First and
Fourth Amendments remained sealed, precluding individuals
from learning about potential “injuries” to their civil liberties
and bringing lawsuits in Article III courts that challenged the
NSA or FBI’s investigation activities. As of 2007, FISC had only published one opinion since the court’s inception in 1978,
prompting legislative attorneys to describe the publication pro189
cedure as “extremely rare.” Although publication of FISC
opinions has been somewhat more common in the wake of the
Snowden disclosures, there is still no way for the public to
know if FISC is engaging in novel statutory or constitutional
analysis.
The FREEDOM Act tackled this impediment to effective
review of the FISA Court and intelligence community. FISC
opinions that “include[] a significant construction or interpretation of any provision of law,” including the term “specific selection term,” should be declassified “to the greatest extent practi190
Additionally, if a provision is exempted from
cable.”
declassification due to a “national security waiver,” the Attor-

188. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 33–34.
189. BAZAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 5.
190. FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 602(a), 129 Stat. 268, 281 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1872(a) (2012)). We note that the term “significant” may be
ambiguous enough to open the door to unnecessary (and harmful) secrecy.
Why not require FISC to publish each opinion that includes a novel application of a statute? What is insignificant in the eyes of the Attorney General
may be significant to the American citizen whose information may be impermissibly obtained under that interpretation. We hope the executive branch
does not abuse this term, but notes its ambiguity, especially given the intelligence community’s improper use of ambiguous terms in the past.
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ney General must still provide the public with a summary of
191
the legal interpretation.
Like other FISA reforms made by the FREEDOM Act, the
declassification of opinions with “significant” constructions and
interpretations of laws is an improvement. But, like other reforms, the declassification option seems like putting a BandAid on a bullet hole. The issue was not just that FISC engaged
in substantial statutory and constitutional interpretation without disclosing its opinions to the public. Rather, the issue was
the role FISC played in interpreting statutes and the
Constitution. Under the original regime, FISC interpreted a
narrow, unambiguous statute, and applied that language to
specific facts provided by the government before authorizing a
search. Now, FISC interprets broad and ambiguous language,
applying that language to procedures employed after a search,
and cannot question the factual base provided by the government. The post-9/11 court is engaged in more of a legal and less
of a factual inquiry. It is therefore less likely that the FISC of
1978 would have needed to engage in the types of statutory and
constitutional interpretation that is commonplace after the
PATRIOT Act and FAA. Like bulk adjudication and collection,
and executive impunity, excessive secrecy is a result of post9/11 changes made to FISA.
We now turn to those broader, structural issues currently
affecting FISC—issues that cannot be resolved with piecemeal
legislation, but instead require reconceptualizing the role of the
court and its relationship to the coordinate branches of government.
III. PROTECTING LIBERTIES BY ENSURING FISC ACTS
LIKE A COURT—NOT AN EXECUTIVE ADJUNCT
The FISA Court currently operates more closely to an executive adjunct than an Article III court. Rather than adjudicating individual cases or controversies, the court approves systems and procedures developed by the executive branch. Rather
than determining whether there is probable cause for a given
search, the court approves programmatic surveillance based on
a factual certification by the government. Even in regular Article III proceedings that are subject to public scrutiny, courts
are hesitant to question the executive branch’s assessment of

191. Id. § 602(c).
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192

national security threats. But the FISA Court is even more
likely to defer when it is engaging in bulk adjudication in a
193
non-adversarial setting. The court is too many steps removed
from the specific searches it approves on a macro scale and,
therefore, less able to question the national security interests
invoked by the executive branch.
In this Part we lay out specific recommendations for reform. All recommendations are tied together by the need for
ensuring civil liberties are protected and vetted through traditional Article III adjudication. If the executive branch chooses
to utilize a confidential court, it must recognize that that court
is still bound by the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. Section A begins by discussing the need for an “adversary”
to the government in FISA Court proceedings. This is particularly important in the post-9/11 adjudications that no longer
resemble the ex parte “warrant” proceedings analogized to
FISC adjudications in 1978. Next, Section B recommends that
the FISA Court no longer approve targeting and minimization
procedures under Section 702. In those proceedings, the court is
approving procedures before they arguably give rise to a cognizable injury, in effect issuing an advisory opinion prohibited
by Article III of the Constitution. Finally, Section C discusses
the need for greater transparency and opportunities for collateral review. Although transparency must be balanced against
the realistic need for protecting intelligence information, enshrouding foreign-intelligence related proceedings in secrecy
undermines public trust in the institution and our government.
A. RETURNING TO QUASI-ADVERSARIAL WARRANT PROCEEDINGS
Courts serve a limited function within our government—
they must resolve cases and controversies involving real disputes between parties of genuine interest. This requirement
serves to ensure that parties to a proceeding both raise and
vigorously examine all aspects of a given issue, which in turn
194
improves judicial decision-making. The FISA Court’s current
192. See, e.g., Cent. Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178–79
(1985).
193. See, e.g., Internet Metadata Opinion and Order, No. PR-TT [REDACTED], slip. op. at 30–31 (FISA Ct. 2006), http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (“Such deference [to the executive
branch] is particularly appropriate in this context, where the Court is not
charged with making independent probable cause findings.”).
194. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., WORKSHOP REGARDING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 215 OF THE
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practice of engaging in broad statutory and constitutional interpretation without the benefit of an adversary to the government does not satisfy the adversity requirement memorialized
195
in the Constitution and Supreme Court jurisprudence.
During FISA’s enactment, a core concern was whether the
FISA Court comported with Article III’s “case or controversy”
196
requirement. Could the ex parte and in camera proceedings of
the court satisfy the constitutional requirement of adversarial
adjudication? The Department of Justice itself conceded in
1978 that lack of adversity before the FISA Court presented a
197
“difficult question.” The Justice Department justified FISA’s
procedures by analogizing them to warrant proceedings, which
are likewise conducted ex parte, involve a particular target,
198
and require judicial approval prior to the search. Similar to
warrant proceedings, the FISA Court would make individualized assessments based on a variant of probable cause, and apply that standard to a specific warrant relating to a specific
search (whether person or place) before the search occurred.
Although FISC still engages in traditional warrant-like
proceedings, many searches are approved via bulk adjudication.
Whereas from 1978 to 2001, the FISA Court engaged exclusively in a quasi-adversarial warrant procedure, today the court is
often even further removed from the discrete facts and argu199
ments that may justify ruling against the government. The
court is less involved in the pre-search inquiry—it must accept
the government’s certification of “relevance” to a “foreign intelUSA PATRIOT ACT AND SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 34 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP] (statement of Honorable James Robertson, Retired, Dist. Court, Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court) (“[A]nybody who has been a judge will tell you
that a judge needs to hear both sides of a case before deciding. It’s quite common, in fact it’s the norm to read one side’s brief or hear one side’s argument
and think, hmm, that sounds right, until we read the other side.”).
195. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (articling the case or controversy provision); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (describing the adversity
requirement and dismissing a suit in which the government effectively was
both the plaintiff and defendant).
196. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
197. Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance Hearings, supra note 132,
at 26 (statement of John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel).
198. Id. at 29.
199. Until 2004, the FISA Court considered “government applications relating to a specific person, a specific place, or a specific communication account
or device.” PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 175 (emphasis
added).
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ligence” purpose, and must do so without the government
providing specific and articulable facts to support its certification. The court plays a more expansive role in post-search procedure, by assessing targeting and minimization criteria. FISC
thus is acting less like a neutral magistrate approving an individualized warrant.
These changes place judges in an uncomfortable position.
FISC judges have less ability to rule against the government
for factual reasons and are left to consider abstract collection
and minimization procedures. Furthermore, judges are more
likely to rule in favor of the government when national security
is involved, leading the FISA Court to become more of a rubber
stamp on behalf of government programs than a neutral check
against executive overreach. This deference is memorialized in
FISC opinions, one of which states, “[T]his Court has often recognized the expertise of the government in foreign intelligence
collection and counterintelligence investigations of espionage
and international terrorism, and accorded great weight to the
200
government’s interpretation of FISA’s standards.” The lack of
adversity leads to less developed arguments being provided to
the FISA Court, and therefore the possibility of less wellreasoned opinions, as borne out by the Second Circuit’s decision
in ACLU v. Clapper. The risk of missing counterarguments to
the government’s position—or failing to understand the depths
of those counterarguments—is all the more pressing now that
the FISA Court regularly engages in broad constitutional and
statutory interpretation. Such risk undermines the integrity
and impartiality of the court.
One potential solution to this problem is to appoint an ombudsman, or “Special Advocate,” to represent the public inter201
est before the FISA Court. This solution was recommended by
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB),
raised in Congress multiple times, and recently codified (to a
limited extent) in the FREEDOM Act. FISA previously provided a mechanism for FISC judges to invite amici, or friends of
the court, to comment on a case. However, the amici provision
was rarely invoked, and never to provide an “assessment of the
200. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, Nos. Multiple (FISA Ct. May 17, 2002) (emphasis added), http://fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc051702.html.
201. Before the FREEDOM Act, FISA did “not provide a mechanism for the
FISC to invite non-governmental parties to provide views on pending government applications.” PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 180.
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government’s legal authorization to conduct surveillance.”
The PCLOB recommended creating a “pool of ‘Special Advocates’ who would be called upon to present independent views
203
to the court in important cases.” The FREEDOM Act adopted
204
Now, FISC
a variation of the PCLOB’s recommendation.
judges may appoint pre-approved “amici” to present arguments
on a FISA application that, “in the opinion of the court, presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law, unless the
court issues a finding that such appointment is not appropri205
ate.” Like other aspects of the FREEDOM Act, this amici
provision is a step in the right direction but does not remedy all
of FISA’s post-9/11 underlying structural wrongs.
There are a few issues with the FREEDOM Act’s amici
provision. First, an amicus does not need to present a view that
is “adversarial” to the government. Rather, the amicus provides
“(A) legal arguments that advance the protection of individual
privacy and civil liberties; (B) information related to intelligence collection or communications technology; or (C) legal arguments or information regarding any other area relevant to
206
the issue presented to the court.” These interests may well be
quasi-adversarial to the government, but there may also be sit202. Id. at 181; see also id. (describing the amicus procedure before the
FISA Court of Review).
203. Id. at 184. Important cases are those involving programmatic surveillance and bulk collection of data, as distinguished from the more individualized proceedings that resemble traditional warrant proceedings. Id. at 183–84.
The PCLOB recommended that the “Special Advocate” only present arguments when invited and that the advocate need not always serve as an “adversary” to the government. Rather, the advocate would read the government’s
position and could agree with it. We think this distinction is not only risky,
but it also misses the mark. As noted by Judge Robertson, the judicial decision-making process is improved when adversarial positions are presented.
See TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194. The requirement of adversity is enforced in other Article III courts. For example, when the Obama
administration declined to argue on behalf of the Defense of Marriage Act, the
Supreme Court and Solicitor General recognized that Congress needed its own
representation. See Editorial, Defense of Marriage Act: Attack the Law, Not the
Lawyer, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/21/
opinion/la-ed-doma-20110421. One side, even the somewhat neutral position of
the “government,” would not suffice. Id. (“[W]ith sharp-witted counsel on both
sides making the strongest possible arguments, it is more likely that justice
will be done. For another, a lawyer who defends an individual or a law, no
matter how unpopular or distasteful, helps ensure that the outcome is viewed
as fair.”).
204. See FREEDOM Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 279 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(g) (2012)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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uations where they are not. Second, an the amicus lacks the
usual authority and rights of an adverse party. The amicus, as
a mere “friend” of the court as opposed to a party to the action,
cannot appeal any “losing” decisions to the FISA Court of Review and Supreme Court, like an adverse party could in any
other individual lawsuit. The amici provision thus provides only a surface level adversity to FISC proceedings, but does not
change the underlying structural issues that limit FISC’s abil207
ity to provide meaningful oversight.
Finally, the amici provision contains hallmark ambiguous
language, which the government and judges may invoke to
avoid appointing an amicus in a given case. What constitutes a
“significant” interpretation of law? If significance is measured
by the potential number of United States persons impacted by
a practice, then an amicus should be appointed in every case
regarding programmatic surveillance. Also, does “novel” mean
from the time of the FREEDOM Act onward, when the FISA
Court could theoretically invoke and benefit from a quasiadversarial amicus? Or, because opinions issued before the enactment of the FREEDOM Act are binding precedent, are those
issues settled (even though they were decided without the benefit of quasi-adversarial briefing)? Moreover, the FREEDOM Act
contains an escape clause for the court—FISC does not need to
appoint an amicus, even if the case involves novel or significant
208
issues, if “such appointment is not appropriate.” What would
render such appointment inappropriate? Congress provided absolutely no guidance, and this is exactly the kind of ambiguous
language that can be used to further the intelligence community’s preference for operating in a cloak of secrecy at the expense
of personal liberties. Indeed, there is already evidence that
members of the FISA Court who are hostile to the FREEDOM

207. See TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194 (statement of
Honorable James Robertson, Retired, Dist. Court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“[T]his process needs an adversary[,] . . . an institutional adversary to challenge and take the other side of anything that is presented to
the FISA Court.”)); cf. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 46 (arguing that
prior proposals of public ombudsmen provided adversity in name only but
would not change the substance of FISC proceedings).
208. FREEDOM Act § 401. The public advocate proposal has received a lot
of attention. But not all proposals are equal. To be effective, there must be “a
more empowered public advocate—one who is authorized to appear even without invitation from the government or the court, and, still more importantly,
who is entitled to full access of information relevant to her duties.” Schlanger,
supra note 5.
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Act’s amici provision will use the Act’s ambiguity to preclude
209
the appointment of an amicus.
Given the weaknesses remaining after the FREEDOM Act,
we would propose that Congress go further. So long as FISC
proceedings no longer resemble traditional warrant proceedings
in which the court is approving a search of a particular person,
place, or thing, there must be truly adverse positions presented
to the court. As mentioned before, the current proceedings likely do not satisfy Article III of the Constitution. In 1978, a significant reason Congress moved forward with FISA—despite
concerns regarding compliance with Article III—was that the
FISA proceedings were limited in nature and greatly resembled
210
traditional warrant proceedings. It was that similarity to
warrant proceedings that justified the creation of a completely
ex parte court. That fundamental premise no longer holds now
that the court also engages in bulk adjudication of programmatic surveillance, which does not resemble the individualized
determinations made by a judge issuing a warrant. In those
proceedings, there must be an individual who presents counterarguments to the government. Those counterarguments
should not be statutorily limited, as they currently are under
the FREEDOM Act. And there should be no exceptions to the
invocation of an adverse party representative.
We would also recommend an expansion of responsibilities,
such that an amicus is more akin to an “ombudsman.”
Ombudsmen, or “official[s] appointed to receive, investigate,
and report on private citizens’ complaints about the govern211
ment,” have been utilized in the Nordic countries for centuries to ensure that executive agencies comply with statutes and

209. See In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for Orders
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, Nos. 15-77, 15-78, slip op. at 3–6
(FISA Ct. June 17, 2015), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
BR%2015-77%2015-78%20Memorandum%20Opinion.pdf (suggesting that it
may be unnecessary to appoint an amicus if “the court concludes . . . the legal
question is relatively simple or is capable of only a single reasonable or rational outcome,” or if the appointment would result in “some degree of additional
expense and delay”); see also Elizabeth Goitein, The FISC’s Newest Opinion:
Proof of the Need for an Amicus, JUST SECURITY (June 23, 2015, 9:43 AM),
http://www.justsecurity.org/24134/fiscs-newest-opinion-proof-amicus (describing weaknesses in Judge Saylor’s analysis).
210. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text.
211. Ombudsman, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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212

fulfill their public obligations. This change in function has the
potential to bring adversity to the court without undermining
the legitimate needs of government to conduct confidential national security surveillance. The ombudsman would not have a
limited role, raise only certain statutorily defined arguments,
or serve at the discretion of FISC. Rather, the ombudsman
would be generally charged with representing the public interests and ensuring that the government pursues surveillance
more broadly in accordance with the Constitution and statutes
of the United States. For example, we believe the ombudsman
should be able to challenge the government’s certification of
“relevance” to a “foreign intelligence investigation.”
A (preferable) alternative to appointing an ombudsman in
cases involving bulk collection and programmatic surveillance,
however, would be limiting the role of FISC, so that it only adjudicates individualized warrant applications, similar to pre9/11 practices.
B. LIMITING FISC TO ADJUDICATING INDIVIDUAL CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES
The approval of programmatic, as opposed to individualized, surveillance also raises questions regarding FISC’s compliance with Article III’s requirement that courts decide individual and real—not abstract—disputes. A fundamental
premise of separation of powers principles is that courts resolve
concrete cases, as opposed to merely issuing advisory opinions.
The prohibition against Article III courts issuing advisory opin213
ions has its foundation in “the earliest days of the Republic.”
In short, federal courts cannot “decide abstract, hypothetical or
214
contingent questions.” FISA Court bulk adjudication of programmatic surveillance arguably constitutes an advisory opinion in two distinct ways—the court’s decisions are reviewed
212. See The Parliamentary Ombudsman, SIVILOMBUDSMANNEN, http://
www.sivilombudsmannen.no/?lang=en_GB (last visited Apr. 11, 2016) (describing the role of the Norwegian Parliamentary Ombudsman).
213. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998).
214. Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); see
also Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 644–45 (1992) (collecting Supreme Court
characterizations of advisory opinions); Krotoszynski, supra note 213, at 17
(“This prohibition generally has been read to preclude federal courts, as a matter of basic Article III jurisprudence, from offering up advice on legal questions
in the absence of a lawsuit brought by litigants with standing to maintain the
action.”).
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post-judgment by the executive branch and the issues present215
ed to the court are not yet ripe for review.
We begin with ripeness, or the lack of a justiciable controversy. Under Section 702, “the [FISA] court has no role in approving individual intrusions at all. Rather, its substantive role
is limited to determining whether generic sets of targeting and
minimization procedures comply with the statute . . . and with
216
the Fourth Amendment.” In essence, the court is ruling on
the appropriateness of guidelines before they have been admin217
istered and applied to a particular person or search. Even
more problematic, the review is brought forward by the government itself—the party that develops the guidelines. The
FISA Court acts more akin to an administrative adjunct, positing on the validity of various agency regulations before they actually go into effect. That is not a traditional Article III role
and is of dubious constitutionality so long as FISC is labeled as
a court over which Article III judges preside.
Second, there is the issue of post-judgment review by executive agencies. Even after the FISA Court issues its opinions on
programmatic surveillance, the executive branch has a significant amount of flexibility to amend its procedures and searches. For example, after the FISA Court held that essentially all
metadata is relevant to investigating terrorism under Section
215, the government had a blank check and could decide for itself how to sift through the collected data for potentially relevant information. Under Section 702, FISC merely approves
generic targeting and minimization procedures, which contain
enough flexibility that the government may then apply them in
a variety of ways to specific searches and collected information.
By approving programmatic surveillance, one step removed
from potential infringements on individuals’ rights, the court is
not deciding an actual controversy—there has not even been a
search or alleged violation of a statutory right.
We believe FISC should no longer engage in the approval
of programmatic surveillance through bulk adjudication, which
is an unanticipated evolution of FISA, following the enactment
215. Lee, supra note 214, at 645–52.
216. GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 71, at 27.
217. Courts do engage in post-enactment review of rules issued by agencies
under the Administrative Procedure Act. That review is different from FISC’s,
however, because an adversarial record is developed through notice and comment rulemaking, and Congress has chosen to create a cause of action for individuals. Finally, it is not the government that brings the action, but instead
an individual aggrieved by the agency rules.
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of the PATRIOT Act and FAA. Doing so not only contradicts the
original intent of Congress in 1978 but also likely violates Article III of the Constitution. As discussed in Part II.B, FISC was
supposed to be a court of limited jurisdiction, engaging in warrant-like adjudications. That is still an appropriate role for
FISC, but only if the court is approving individual warrant applicants ex ante and individuals subject to surveillance are notified and able to challenge the surveillance ex post. However,
FISC additionally approves broad searches—including one
search authorized by a single court order issued under the FAA
that permitted the targeting of 89,138 individuals, groups, and
218
organizations. The government cannot credibly argue that
such a broad search is related to the individualized and specific
facts that are the hallmark of Article III adjudications, especially when the search is premised on a factual certification by
the government. By approving such broad searches, FISC lends
legitimacy (and insulation) to programmatic surveillance, but
not in a meaningful way that actually limits executive authority.
Even more problematic, however, FISC has become an adjunct to intelligence agencies, providing advisory opinions on
the procedures that the agencies put in place. Those sorts of de219
cisions should not be made by an Article III court, period.
And they certainly should not be made by an Article III court
that can make broad constitutional and statutory interpretations contrary to the holdings of other, transparent and tradi220
tional, Article III courts. Rather, the targeting and minimization procedures should be promulgated by an executive agency,
and only considered by an Article III court if there is a cognizable injury to a party as a direct result of the application of those
procedures. Pre-enforcement review of rules and regulations is
limited within the confines of the Administrative Procedure
221
Act. The FISA Court should not regularly engage in such re218. See Barton Gellman et al., The NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted
-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/
8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html.
219. See TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194, at 36 (statement
of Honorable James Robertson, Dist. Court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court) (“[T]hat’s not the bailiwick of judges. Judges don’t make policy. They
review policy determinations for compliance with statutory law but they do so
in the context once again of adversary process.”).
220. See supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
221. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2015) (limiting judicial review to “final agency ac-
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view, especially when it is only the government that presents
the “issue” (i.e., proposed procedures) to the court, as opposed
to an aggrieved party with a cognizable injury.
It may be argued that FISC’s role approving programmatic
surveillance is a necessary evil given the evolving nature of
technology, the vast amount of information government agencies need to sift through in national security investigations, and
222
the interconnectedness of society. Certainly we agree that
there is more information available and that the lines between
domestic and international communications are blurry. However, this is all the more reason that the procedures under which
the government collects and retains information should be subject to public scrutiny, and only addressed by a court if there is
223
a concrete and ripe dispute. Public debate of targeting and
minimization procedures need not threaten national security.
They are general procedures (which could be redacted as necessary) that apply regardless of who/what is being searched.
By approving generalized procedures rather than individualized warrants, the FISA Court is no longer acting like an Article III court charged with making individual and concrete decisions (and is no longer acting consistently with its original
1978 design). FISC instead operates more like an Article II adjunct to the executive branch, issuing advisory opinions on procedures before they are applied to a specific individual and set
of facts. The court is already in a difficult position, lacking the
benefit of an adversarial presentation of issues. It is even less
likely to question the government when it is engaging in premature judicial review, without the benefit of an actual injury to
serve as the basis for limiting government action.
C. EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR COLLATERAL CHALLENGE
AND REVIEW
The constitutional requirements described in Sections A
and B serve to protect more than the rights of individual litigants—they also ensure that all relevant arguments are made,
tion[s] for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”).
222. Increased globalization does pose a problem. The distinction between
foreign and domestic communications is becoming increasingly blurry. However, this is all the more reason that procedures for searches pursuant to Section
702 should be publicly discussed and debated, giving members of society warning about the scope of their communications that may fall within the purview
of a Section 702 search.
223. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the procedural requirements of approving searches).
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enabling the FISA Court to make more informed and impartial
decisions, and citizens to actively and accurately participate in
our constitutional democracy. The statutes and orders FISC
has been enforcing “require[] actual policy analysis: weighing
the security gains against liberty costs. Ideally, that weighing
224
should occur in public.” The impact public discourse can have
on society and the judiciary is evidenced by the nation’s re225
sponse to the Snowden disclosures. Public pressure following
the Snowden disclosures—including via Freedom of Information Act lawsuits—led to the declassification of FISC opinions and the eventual enactment of the FREEDOM Act. Even
so, almost all FISA Court opinions remain classified. Although
troubling in individual cases, this is particularly troubling
when a court is making more binding statutory and constitutional interpretations than in the past.
First, as recognized by the FREEDOM Act, FISC should
not issue confidential statutory and constitutional interpretations. Its only original purpose was to authorize individual
subpoenas in the most sensitive cases involving national security—not to create binding, but confidential, legal precedent.
FISC’s statutory and constitutional interpretations are even
more questionable when a traditional Article III court reaches
a publicized contrary conclusion. Circuit splits in our federal
court system are inevitable, but usually the two courts interpreting the statute or constitutional provision stand on equal
footing in the eyes of Article III—the decision is made after a
particular case or controversy is adjudicated in an adversarial
setting. FISC, however, is not bound by any court other than
the FISA Court of Review and the Supreme Court. Therefore,
only months after the Second Circuit issued its thorough and
224. Schlanger, supra note 5 (emphasis added). Public scrutiny is particularly important because leaving regulation to “insiders” risks “impotence” and
“capture.” Id.
225. Similar public discourse, particularly in the wake of Watergate, led to
the formation of the Church Committee and the eventual enactment of FISA.
During the last eight years, beginning with Ramparts magazine’s exposure of CIA covert relationships with non-governmental organizations, there has been a series of allegations in the press and Congress
which have provoked serious questions about the conduct of intelligence agencies at home and abroad. The Watergate disclosures raised
additional questions concerning abuse of power by the executive
branch, misuse of intelligence agencies, and the need to strengthen
legal restraints against such abuses.
CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 10; see SCHWARZ, supra note
167, at 175–76 (providing a thorough description of the Church Committee’s
origins).
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well-reasoned opinion in ACLU v. Clapper, holding that the
NSA’s bulk collection program violated Section 215 (and likely
the Fourth Amendment), the FISA Court disregarded the Se226
cond Circuit’s opinion and upheld the program. FISC reached
its contrary conclusion after a process significantly less adversarial than that before the Second Circuit, undermining the
public credibility of FISC’s legal analysis. Thus, the “split” is
not as justifiable as a traditional circuit split—especially given
that the Second Circuit is a court of general jurisdiction, broadly tasked with interpreting law, whereas FISC is a court of limited jurisdiction, tasked with authorizing a limited subset of
searches.
Even assuming that the FISA Court can create binding
statutory and constitutional analysis, those interpretations
must be made public. There is no doubt that “secrecy plays an
essential role in delicate intelligence work . . . [but] it cannot
justify submerging in shadow entire programs, sweeping policy
changes, important shifts in law, or acts that subvert the ideals
227
of America.” Such a justification is particularly lacking with
regard to FISC, which was established to prevent disclosure of
individual national security investigations and threats—very
different from the broad and open-ended statutory interpretations of Sections 702 and 215, divorced from a specific search,
in which the FISA Court currently engages. Although the
FREEDOM Act does put procedures in place for declassification
of certain opinions, there remain significant potential loopholes
and ways for the government to evade disclosure.
A second related recommended reform is that there must
be more opportunity for collateral review of the government’s
interpretation of national security laws. Society is demanding
greater “transparency and accountability” mechanisms to ensure the government, with FISC’s approval, does not subvert
228
privacy to nominal security interests. The publishing of redacted FISC opinions serves this goal because it may provide a
basis for litigant standing to challenge a given collection prac226. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, slip op. at 9–15 (FISA Ct.
June 29, 2015) (“Second Circuit rulings are not binding on the FISC, and this
Court respectfully disagrees with that Court’s analysis . . . .”).
227. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 9, at 46.
228. See Letter from Advocacy for Principled Action in Gov’t et al., to President Barack Obama et al. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.openthegovernment
.org/sites/default/files/NSA_coalition_letter_032515.pdf (putting forth recommendations for legislation reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act).
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tice. But traditional Article III courts can also further this goal
by inquiring into the basis of the government’s invocation of the
state secrets privilege. Senator Leahy has introduced multiple
bills with bipartisan support that would codify the state secrets
privilege and courts’ obligation to actually review the allegedly
229
secret evidence. Those proposed bills do not undermine the
government’s ability to assert the privilege and keep national
security-related documents classified. “Rather, the bill[s] would
allow judges to look at the actual evidence the Government
submits so that they, neutral judges, rather than selfinterested executive branch officials, would render the ultimate
230
decision whether the State secrets privilege should apply.”
Similarly, courts should not permit the government to completely dismiss suits that challenge the constitutionality of foreign surveillance under the state secrets doctrine. There is no
reason that applying an evidentiary privilege should “permit
the removal of entire allegations resulting in out-and-out dis231
missal of the entire suit” —especially when courts have expertise reviewing classified information and FISC has procedures
in place for in camera review of government submissions in ad232
versarial FISC proceedings. By blindly accepting the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege, courts abdicate
their responsibility under Marbury to ensure that coordinate
branches of government act in accordance with the Constitu233
tion.
Both the publishing of redacted opinions and expanding of
avenues for third party litigant challenges to FISC’s statutory
and constitutional interpretations reflect the same underlying
value—there must be a certain amount of transparency and accountability in the operation of the intelligence community.
This is important not only to reduce the current culture of impunity but also because “it is critical to the integrity of the process that the public have confidence in its impartiality and ri234
gor.” Currently, there remains in our society “fundamental
229. See S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 2533, 110th Cong. (2008).
230. 155 CONG. REC. 3553, 3620 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy
introducing S. 417).
231. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
232. FISC R.P. 7.
233. Even the Reynolds court recognized that “[j]udicial control over the
evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers.”
Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1953).
234. PCLOB REPORT, SECTION 215, supra note 113, at 182.
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distrust” of the intelligence agencies and systems put into place
235
by FISA. Some secrets must be protected in the name of na236
tional security. But we must not permit a system in which
the government can claim privilege without a coordinate
branch of government confirming the validity of the invocation
of that privilege. The Church Committee recommended that the
“burden of proof should be on those who ask that a secret pro237
gram or policy be kept secret.” That recommendation rings
true today. The default must be transparency.
IV. PREVENTING A RELAPSE DURING THE NEXT
NATIONAL EMERGENCY
Our “democratic system” must “effectively govern[] in the
238
crucial area of secret intelligence.” Recently, Snowden’s disclosures put pressure on the United States government to establish systems within the intelligence community that limit
the power of intelligence agencies—not necessarily the power to
conduct intelligence operations, but the power to conduct such
operations at the cost of civil liberties. Congress responded to
those pressures with the FREEDOM Act, which is an admirable step in the right direction. But given the continuous use of
ambiguous statutory language and the lack of sufficient congressional oversight, the risk remains that “mission creep” will
once again erode civil liberties as the nature of our enemies and
foreign powers shift.
The Church Committee found that the subtle erosion of
personal liberties occurred because Congress failed to issue
clear laws and provide adequate oversight, and the courts thus
could more easily avoid making clear rulings on the relationship between the executive and legislative branches when it
239
came to national security. In sum, the Committee found that
235. Id. at 15.
236. For example, the Church Committee suggested that “details about
military activities, technology, sources of information and particular intelligence methods are secrets that should be carefully protected.” CHURCH COMM.
REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 12–13. But the executive should not be able
to shield embarrassing or controversial programs under the guise of security.
237. Id. at 8.
238. Id. at 15.
239. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 185 (“The
standards governing the use of these [surveillance] techniques have been imprecise and susceptible to expansive interpretation and in the absence of any
judicial check on the application of these vague standards to particular cases,
it was relatively easy for intelligence agencies and their superiors to extend
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“intelligence activities have undermined the constitutional
rights of citizens and that they have done so primarily because
checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitu240
tion to assure accountability have not been applied.” This
fundamental lesson of constitutional law has once again been
ignored in the wake of 9/11. The systems of checks and balances recommended by the Church Committee must be modified
given the growth of the intelligence community, technological
241
advances, and increased globalization.
We use this final Part to return to the first principles of the
Church Committee and bring foundational principles of separation of powers back to the discourse regarding security and individual liberties. We must reestablish a permanent system of
external checks—via congressional committees, public disclosures (of general principles and systems, not specific information that could undermine intelligence operations), and traditional Article III review, informed by statutes with cogent
and limiting language. Without “[c]lear legal standards and effective oversight,” the abuses which led to the formation of the
Church Committee and the Snowden disclosures may once
again creep into intelligence practices, and “domestic intelligence activity . . . [will] undermine the democratic nation it is
242
intended to protect.”
There must be robust congressional oversight, and that
oversight must be embraced, not eschewed, by the intelligence
community. The Church Committee found that intelligence
overreach occurred in part because “Congress ha[d] not effectively fulfilled its constitutional role [as a check on the
243
executive branch] in the area of domestic intelligence.” The
Committee noted that although the “problem of how Congress
can effectively use secret knowledge in its legislative process
remains to be resolved . . . a strong and effective oversight
committee is an essential first step” to addressing that chal244
lenge. We need “empowered [] insiders who are attuned to
the[] [surveillance techniques] to many cases where they were clearly inappropriate.”).
240. Id. at 289.
241. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STRENGTHENING INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 5–8 (Michael German ed., 2015) [hereinafter INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT].
242. See CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 20.
243. Id. at 280.
244. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added).
For example, only a “few members” of Congress knew of the “secret charter for
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civil liberties” because otherwise, when making intelligence decisions, civil liberties “receive[] not just less attention, but no
245
consideration at all.” Moreover, given the inevitable need to
classify some practices related to national security intelligence,
it falls on Congress to ensure “that the authorities as they are
publicly presented are consistent with the manner in which
246
they are being exercised.”
Oversight today is undermined not only by structural
changes—such as a larger intelligence community and technological advances—but also by institutional changes, particularly excessive congressional secrecy. For example, Congress was
not “adequately informed about the NSA’s post-9/11 collection
activities” in the Terrorist Surveillance Program because “the
Bush administration limited notifications regarding the NSA
program to . . . the chairs and ranking members of each intelli247
gence committee.” There may be some instances where, due
to extraordinary circumstances regarding a covert action, limited notification may be appropriate. But “intelligence collection programs,” such as those exposed by Edward Snowden, do
248
not fall within that narrow category.
Congressional oversight does not mean the executive
branch will be constantly at odds with congressional committees. Instead, congressional oversight provides both an important check on executive authority by ensuring the executive
branch is not misleading Congress and the public, and provides
249
public legitimacy to “secret” operations. Take, for example,
the recent experience of Senator Diane Feinstein, Chair of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, and the release of the torture
intelligence activities,” and those that did had no means of discussing that information with other members of Congress. Id.
245. Schlanger, supra note 5.
246. See Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 159.
247. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT, supra note 241, at 10.
248. See id. at 10–11. Indeed, in February 2016 Congress held a hearing on
Section 702 of the FAA but closed the hearing to the public, despite calls by
civil rights organizations for opening the hearing, at least in part. See 162
CONG. REC. 5453 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2016); Letter from Access Now et al., to
Robert W. Goodlatte and John Conyers, Members, House Judiciary Comm.
(Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.openthegovernment.org/sites/default/files/Letter%
20for%20the%20Judiciary%20Committee%20on%20Section%20702%
20Hearing.pdf.
249. See SCHWARZ, supra note 167, at 81 (noting that “the Bush-Cheney
administration never permitted the public to ‘be exposed to’ a ‘clear, sustained
and principled debate on the merits,’ [of post-9/11 detention and interrogation
tactics] without ‘excessive secrecy’”).
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report. Feinstein is one of the “bigge[st] booster[s] of the C.I.A.,”
but she also requires honesty and transparency from intelli250
gence agencies. As she has said, “Oversight can’t just be going
to a hearing and listening to what somebody says, when you
251
don’t know whether they’re telling you the truth or not.” She
was challenged by both the CIA and the White House when she
began investigating allegations of torture and, even more so,
when she decided to make some such information public. She
was told that releasing the torture report would incite violence
around the globe. But, despite the executive branch’s dire predictions, the skies did not fall. Instead, both the executive
branch and society were assured that the intelligence committee provided actual oversight.
Oversight goes hand-in-hand with providing clear statutory directives. Feinstein’s primary recommendation to President
Obama after the issuance of the report was closing legal “loop252
holes” that made the torture possible. Such loopholes, often
provided by fuzzy language, also exist in FISA, as amended by
the PATRIOT Act, FAA, and FREEDOM Act. Take, for example, the use of the term “foreign intelligence” in Section 702—
one of the terms identified by the Church Committee as provid253
ing “ambiguous” and “fuzzy instructions.” In 1978, FISA limited search authority to “foreign powers” and their “agents,” not
only narrowly defined terms but also terms that functionally
served the needs of the intelligence community. The FAA, however, brought with it the return of the ambiguous term “foreign
intelligence.” Moreover, the FISA Court cannot question the
executive branch’s “foreign intelligence” determination, leaving
the meaning of that term completely within the executive
254
branch’s discretion. The use of such broad language is not
good for a variety of reasons. First, it provides fodder to agencies that are prone to mission creep and prioritizing “security”
255
over personal liberties. Second, and perhaps more important250. Connie Bruck, The Inside War, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/22/the-inside-war.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 31–44 and accompanying text.
254. Justice Douglas stated in Katz v. United States that the “[e]xecutive
branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested” in cases involving national security. 389 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1967). We think that is an accurate
statement, particularly when Congress opens the door by placing malleable
phrases at the heart of the executive’s authority.
255. As noted by civil rights scholar Margo Schlanger, “[P]ro-civil-liberties
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ly, it provides minimal guidance to the FISA Court, which is already in a difficult position, serving as the only “adverse” party,
or check, on the government’s use of intelligence for security
purposes.
The FAA provides a prime example of the interconnection
between congressional oversight and clear statutory directives
for an additional reason. At the time the FAA was enacted,
Congress had limited information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program and, thus, the scope of programmatic surveil256
lance. So when Congress was “updating” FISA at the executive branch’s request, it lacked complete information on the
257
scope of programs to which it was giving statutory credence.
Therefore, most members of Congress did not “contemplate[]
[the] broad, programmatic collection” Section 702 purportedly
258
If Congress had been operating with full
authorized.
knowledge of the scope of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, it
is very likely it would have chosen different language when
structuring Section 702, guaranteeing greater civil liberty protection to United States persons. And the lack of more artful
draftsmanship by Congress opened the door for FISC to broadly
interpret the statute in the government’s favor via its traditional deference to the executive branch on issues of national
259
security.
Constitutional structural protections—such as robust congressional oversight and a comprehensive (and clear) statutory
framework—are even more essential given the evolution of both
technology and increased globalization. From 1978 to the present, as technology evolved, the intelligence community minimized the scope of those evolutions, attempting to acquire more
views have received all too little respect [in the intelligence community], unless transformed by a court or congress into authoritative law.” Schlanger, supra note 5.
256. See Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 158–59.
257. See INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT, supra note 241, at 11 (arguing that
“the public, Congress, and the courts . . . [could not] meaningfully participate
in the debate” regarding the Patriot Act and FAA because “most Americans
(and even some members of Congress) did not know the scale of collection taking place under these authorities”).
258. Donohue, Section 702, supra note 62, at 158–59. Notably, the few
members of Congress that explicitly acknowledged concern that Section 702
would be used to engage in broad, programmatic surveillance, did not support
the bill. Id. at 174.
259. Id. at 159 (“Congress similarly neglected to uphold the limit placed on
the intelligence community to not knowingly collect domestic conversations.
Instead, it relied on FISC to do so—a task that the Court failed to do.”).
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information through outdated modes of statutory and constitutional analysis. One Bush official recently stated that it was inaccurate to call the Terrorist Surveillance Program’s collection
of metadata “surveillance,” because surveillance requires the
260
acquisition of “content.” That may have been a convenient position for someone in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, but it is contrary to public opinion and Article III
court opinions issued through traditional, public, adversarial
261
adjudication. The next technological frontier is the scope of
encrypted information the government should be able to access
262
with a FISC order. If the decisions are made behind closed
doors, history has shown that the intelligence community is
likely to broadly construe its searching authority and minimize
technological incursions on privacy, unless some external authority questions the agency’s application of former laws to new
263
technology.
In short, we are more likely to find the appropriate balance
between security and liberty if intelligence agencies operate
within the usual confines of the Constitution. No one—and no
entity—is above the law. This fundamental premise of our constitutional democracy does not undermine our national security—it enhances it. Clear laws guiding intelligence agencies and
courts interpreting the actions of those agencies will clarify the
roles of both the executive and judicial branch. And strong congressional oversight will also serve to limit executive overreach.
Each coequal branch must play its role, utilizing its unique
competencies, if we are to find the right balance between security and liberty.

260. TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194, at 16–21 (statements of Steven Bradbury, Retired, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
261. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment extended to searches of cell phones).
262. Nicole Perlroth, Tech Giants Urge Obama To Reject Policies that
Weaken Encryption, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/05/20/technology/tech-giants-urge-obama-to-reject-policies-that-weaken
-encryption-technology.html.
263. See generally CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 281–
84 (describing a pattern of intelligence agencies undertaking programs “without authorization, with insufficient authorization, or in defiance of express orders”).
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CONCLUSION
In the wake of 9/11, our country, for the second time in half
a century, lost sight of the fact “that to ignore the dangers
posed by secret government action is to invite the further
264
weakening of our democracy.” A sense of urgency, similar to
that catalyzed by the Church Committee’s findings, returned in
the wake of Edward Snowden’s disclosures. Once again, “secrets” were unveiled, and the nation—and world—lost faith in
our nation’s ability to protect itself without invading individual
liberties. Through the FREEDOM Act, Congress attempted to
repair some of that lost faith. However, as we have shown, the
FREEDOM Act does not remedy the structural and procedural
wrongs currently plaguing the FISA Court and that court’s relationship to coordinate branches of government.
The FISA Court no longer fulfills its intended limited role
in adjudicating sensitive matters of national security. When the
executive branch seeks a warrant to search a specific target or
place, it is akin to a traditional warrant application and understandable that such a proceeding would need to be ex parte and
265
confidential. However, when the executive branch comes to a
confidential court, asking it to approve procedures divorced
from a specific search or controversy, asking it to approve the
collection of myriad communications that may implicate United
States persons, the executive branch is asking the court to exceed its original design and, more importantly, its constitutional role. To the extent the government needs approval of surveillance procedures and bulk collection unrelated to a specific
investigative subpoena, those requests must be made through
traditional mechanisms—whether administrative (via regulations) or judicial (via judicial review in traditional Article III
courts). It cannot be that the only way to effectively further national security interests is to create a court that violates Article
III of the Constitution.
There is undoubtedly an “inherent conflict between the
government’s perceived need to conduct surveillance and the
citizens’ constitutionally protected rights of privacy and dis264. CHURCH COMM. REPORT, BOOK I, supra note 1, at 8.
265. See, e.g., TRANSCRIPT, PCLOB WORKSHOP, supra note 194, at 35
(statement of Judge James Robertson) (“The FISA approval process works just
fine when it deals with individual applications for surveillance warrants because approving search warrants and wiretap orders and trap and trace orders
and foreign intelligence surveillance warrants one at a time is familiar ground
for judges.” (emphasis added)).
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sent.” However, history has also taught us that the erosion of
liberties for the sake of security is a risky prospect, and one
that does more harm than good for our nation over the long
267
run. This is especially true given the “tragic conceit” of secrecy—“[i]nevitably, the truth prevails and policies pursued on the
premise that they could be plausibly denied, in the end damage
America’s reputation and the faith of her people in their gov268
ernment.” As recognized by the Church Committee’s domestic
task force: “Knowledge is the key to control. Secrecy should no
longer be allowed to shield the existence of the constitutional,
legal and moral problems from the scrutiny of government or
269
from the American people themselves.” It would be better for
personal liberties, and the development of statutory and constitutional law, if FISC operated less as a shield to broad secret
intelligence policies, and more like an Article III court.
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